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Crafting a Model State Law for 
Today’s Beer Industry 
Brian D. Anhalt* 
INTRODUCTION 
Archaeologist Patrick McGovern hypothesizes that alcohol 
started the “engine of society,”1 but today’s state laws are causing 
this engine to run rough.2  As history reflects, beer quickly took 
hold as an important part of American culture: Thomas Jefferson 
was a homebrewer, the Continental Congress provided a daily 
ration of beer to soldiers in the American Revolutionary War, and 
the Mayflower landed in Massachusetts, rather than the Hudson 
River area, in part because of a shrinking supply of beer.3  The 
beer market has grown to a $100 billion business, and its 
 
      * Senior Managing Editor, Michigan State Law Review; Candidate for 
Juris Doctor, Michigan State University College of Law, 2016; B.A., St. 
Norbert College, 2013.  The author would like to thank Professor Glen 
Staszewski for his time and guidance throughout the Comment-writing 
process and law school in general.  The author also wishes to thank the 
members of the Rogers Williams University Law Review for their efforts in 
getting this Comment ready for publication.  Lastly, the author expresses his 
gratitude to his family for their continued encouragement and support.  
 1.  Michael Kan, Did a Thirst for Beer Spark Civilization?, 
INDEPENDENT (Jan. 15, 2010), http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/history/ 
did-a-thirst-for-beer-spark-civilization-1869187.html. 
 2.  See Ben Bullard, Craft Brewers Challenge Texas Law over 
Distribution Rights, PERS. LIBERTY (Dec. 16, 2014), http://www.personal 
liberty.com/craft-brewers-challenge-texas-law-distribution-rights. 
 3.  See AMY MITTELMAN, BREWING BATTLES: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN 
BEER 6–22 (2008); see also Kenneth G. Elzinga, Beer, in THE STRUCTURE OF 
AMERICAN INDUSTRY 85, 85 (Walters Adams & James W. Brock eds., 10th ed. 
2001). 
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prominence has spurred regulation.4  Current regulations in 
many states are outdated, and thus stifle competition and reduce 
the variety of beer available for consumers.5 
The modern three-tier structure of American beer regulations 
separates breweries, distributors, and retailers into three distinct 
tiers.6  Breweries may sell only to distributors, distributors to 
retailers, and retailers to consumers.7  To regulate the 
relationships between the three tiers, states have enacted beer 
franchise laws,8 limits on self-distribution to retailers,9 and limits 
on selling directly to consumers.10  Before states enacted beer 
franchise laws, a small number of large breweries dominated the 
market, holding a natural bargaining advantage over a large 
number of small distributors.11  Beer franchise laws attempted to 
 
 4.  National Beer Sales & Production Data, BREWERS ASS’N, https:// 
www.brewersassociation.org/statistics/national-beer-sales-production-data 
(last visited Nov. 14, 2015) (valuating the “overall beer market” in 2014 at 
$101.5 billion); see Elzinga, supra note 3, at 85. 
 5.  See, e.g., Bullard, supra note 2.  
 6.  Barry Kurtz & Bryan H. Clements, Beer Distribution Law as 
Compared to Traditional Franchise Law, 33 FRANCHISE L.J. 397, 400 (2014); 
Gregory E. Durkin, Note, What Does Granholm v. Heald Mean for the Future 
of the Twenty-First Amendment, the Three-Tier System, and Efficient Alcohol 
Distribution?, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1095, 1097 (2006). 
 7.  Kurtz & Clements, supra note 6, at 400; Durkin, supra note 6, at 
1097. 
 8.  See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 3-5-31(b)(3) (2014); ME. STAT. tit. 28, § 
1407 (2014); see also Andrew Tamayo, Comment, What’s Brewing in the Old 
North State: An Analysis of the Beer Distribution Laws Regulating North 
Carolina’s Craft Breweries, 88 N.C. L. REV. 2198, 2213 (2010). 
 9.  See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 61-4-940(A) (2014) (“A manufacturer or 
brewer of beer, ale, porter, or other malt beverages or a person who imports 
these products produced outside the United States must not sell, barter, 
exchange, transfer, or deliver for resale beer to a person not having a 
wholesale permit.”); see also Tamayo, supra note 8, at 2231–35.  Self-
distribution limits restrict a brewery’s ability to directly distribute to 
retailers, preventing breweries from bypassing the second-tier distributors.  
See Tamayo, supra note 8, at 2231–35. 
 10.  See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 16-3-230 (2015) (“[A]ll beer that is to be 
distributed in Montana . . . must be . . . shipped, either directly or via a 
licensed storage depot, to a licensed wholesaler.”); see also Shirley Chen, 
Student Article, Craft Beer Drinkers Reignite the Wine Wars, 26 LOY. 
CONSUMER L. REV. 526, 527 (2014) (comparing the constitutional limits on 
direct shipping for wine sellers with direct-sale limits for breweries). 
 11.  See Tamayo, supra note 8, at 2213.  Direct-sale limits restrict a 
brewery’s ability to sell beer directly to consumers.  See, e.g., MONT. CODE 
ANN. § 16-3-213 (“Except as provided for small breweries . . . it is unlawful for 
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correct this bargaining differential by requiring the inclusion of 
statutorily mandated distributor protections in franchise 
agreements.12  These laws reflected the market conditions at the 
time of their enactment.13 
Subsequent to states enacting these protections, the dynamic 
of the beer industry changed, but the regulations remained the 
same.14  The rising popularity of craft beer led to an expansion in 
the number of small breweries.15  As small breweries grew in 
number, other factors led to a consolidation of market power in 
the distribution market, causing most breweries to lose their 
bargaining advantage in franchise negotiations.16  Despite the 
shift of market power in favor of distributors, many states left the 
mandated protections for distributors in place.17  Consequently, 
these market changes left beer-industry laws outdated and ill-
equipped for the current market environment, disadvantaging 
craft breweries bargaining for franchise agreements with 
distributors.18 
In addition to disadvantaging breweries in franchise 
negotiations, the current laws regulating distribution often inhibit 
 
any brewer or breweries or beer importer to have or own any permit to sell or 
retail beer at any place or premises.  It is the intention of this section to 
prohibit brewers and beer importers from engaging in the retail sale of 
beer.”). 
 12.  Kurtz & Clements, supra note 6, at 402–07; Tamayo, supra note 8, at 
2213 (“This protection of distributors was seen as necessary to further ‘the 
goal of fragmented, weak players that [are] unable to wield political and 
marketing power’ and, in turn, to maintain the vitality of the three tier 
system.” (alteration in original) (quoting Evan T. Lawson, The Future of the 
Three-Tiered System as a Control of Marketing Alcoholic Beverages, in SOCIAL 
AND ECONOMIC CONTROL OF ALCOHOL: THE 21ST AMENDMENT IN THE 21ST 
CENTURY 31, 33 (Carole J. Jurkiewicz & Murphy J. Painter eds., 2008))).  
 13.  See Tamayo, supra note 8, at 2202 (noting that the laws were 
enacted in response to the concentration of market power in large breweries 
and their bargaining advantage over distributors). 
 14.  Id. (stating that since the enactment of the beer franchise laws, the 
beer industry has significantly changed, but distributors have resisted 
changes to the law). 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  See id. at 2231–32. 
 18.  Id. at 2218 (“As distributors have moved from small family-owned 
operations to much larger corporations, many small brewers question the 
rationale for the laws when the distributors have more bargaining power 
than they do.”).  
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new and small breweries’ abilities to reach new markets by 
limiting the opportunity to self-distribute to retailers and directly 
sell to consumers.19  New and small breweries often struggle to 
form distribution agreements: they have not yet built retailer and 
consumer bases, and so their brands lack value and require 
significant investment by a distributor.20  At the same time, state 
laws prevent breweries from directly selling to consumers and 
self-distributing to retailers to build those bases to lessen the need 
for distributor investment.21  If a distributor will not distribute 
the beer, and if the brewery cannot directly sell its beer to 
consumers or self-distribute to retailers, then the brewery cannot 
reach new markets.22 
To improve competition in the market and to promote the 
variety that today’s consumers demand, modifications must be 
made to beer franchise laws, self-distribution laws, and direct-sale 
laws in order to equalize the bargaining relationship.  While 
states should maintain the three-tier system to prevent abuses by 
large breweries, they should exempt small breweries, and allow 
small breweries to self-distribute and sell directly to consumers.  
States should also exempt small breweries from the beer franchise 
laws.  These proposals reflect the realities of the modern beer 
market and promote competition and variety. 
Part I of this Comment discusses the craft beer revolution and 
its impact on the current beer market with the significant increase 
in the number of breweries.  Part II summarizes the development 
of modern beer regulations in America, including the three-tier 
system, beer franchise laws, self-distribution laws, and direct-sale 
laws.  Part III proposes a model law to remedy the problems 
caused by the current regulations, including exemptions for small 
breweries.23  These solutions would meet consumers’ demands 
and create an economically healthy beer market. 
 
 19.  See id. at 2231–35. 
 20.  See id. at 2233–35. 
 21.  See id. 
 22.  See Chen, supra note 10, at 541 (explaining that craft breweries may 
be unable to continue their business if they experience difficulty in “not 
be[ing] picked up by” distributors and being unable to sell directly to 
consumers). 
 23.  The full text of the author’s proposed model law is contained in an 
Appendix.  See infra pp. 213–14 
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I.  BEER IN AMERICA: THE INDUSTRY AND THE ADVENT OF CRAFT BEER 
The close relationship between beer and society that had 
existed in Europe survived the migration to America24 and has 
today culminated in the craft beer revolution.25  American 
colonists brought the tradition of beer to the New World.26  At 
first, Americans produced beer locally, and typically in the 
home.27  Industrialization in the nineteenth century then allowed 
for the development of commercial brewing,28 and by 1900, there 
were 1,816 breweries in the United States.29  However, by 1978, 
that number had dwindled to eighty-nine breweries30 because of a 
 
 24.  See MITTELMAN, supra note 3, at 5–6 (outlining the history of beer in 
Europe and its transportation to Colonial America). 
 25.  Number of Breweries, BREWERS ASS’N, http://www.brewersassociation 
.org/statistics/number-of-breweries (last visited Nov. 15, 2015) (detailing data 
on the prevalence of craft breweries); see also Craft Brewer Defined, BREWERS 
ASS’N, http://www.brewersassociation.org/statistics/craft-brewer-defined (last 
visited Nov. 15, 2015) (defining criteria for craft breweries).   
 26.  See MITTELMAN, supra note 3, at 6 (stating that the first American 
settlers came from societies of beer drinkers and that all European ships to 
America provided beer provisions). 
 27.  Id. at 6–7.  Home production was made possible by beer’s simple 
ingredients: (1) barley or grain; (2) hops; (3) cultured yeast; and (4) water.  
See Elzinga, supra note 3, at 85.  Some families served beer to the public out 
of their homes, creating the first American drinking establishments.  
MITTELMAN, supra note 3, at 7 (explaining that home production was the 
norm because of transportation difficulties and that home production evolved 
into “rudimentary drinking establishments”).  The popularity of these 
establishments grew, and by the eighteenth century, most colonists in 
Connecticut, for example, were no more than three miles from such places.  
Id. at 9. 
 28.  K. Austin Kerr, The American Brewing Industry, 1865-1920, in THE 
DYNAMICS OF THE INTERNATIONAL BREWING INDUSTRY SINCE 1800, at 176, 176–
77 (R. G. Wilson & T. R. Gourvish eds., 1998).  Before the American 
Industrial Revolution, most breweries were small, local business.  Id. at 176.  
Brewing, like other industries such as food-processing, benefited by using 
industrial processes.  Id. at 177.  The industrial revolution allowed for the 
development of large “shipping brewer[ies]”, such as Pabst and Anheuser-
Busch.  Id. at 176–77.  The industrial processes allowed these breweries to 
vertically integrate, establish substantial factories, and create complex 
national distribution systems.  Id. at 177.  These breweries benefited from 
the increased access to capital and the development of a complete national 
railway.  Id.  Increased scientific knowledge solved quality-maintenance 
issues, allowing for longer transportation.  Id. at 178–79. 
 29.  Number of Breweries, supra note 25.  
 30.  Id.  
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“merger-acquisition trend,”31 as well as the impact of economies of 
scale.32 
As the number of breweries decreased, one brewery opened 
that would spark a change in the industry.  The 1976 opening of 
New Albion Brewery marked the end of this decline and the 
beginning of the craft beer revolution.33  The founder, Jack 
McAuliffe, brewed with recycled dairy equipment and Pepsi-Cola 
syrup drums.34  While the brewery closed six years later, it left its 
mark as “the most important failed brewery in the industry’s 
history” by inspiring other entrepreneurs to start craft 
breweries.35  By 1995, the number of breweries climbed to 858.36  
And by 2013, craft breweries represented 98% of the then-almost 
3,000 breweries established.37 As of late 2015, the number of 
 
 31.  Elzinga, supra note 3, at 92.  There were about 170 horizontal 
brewery mergers between 1950 and 1983.  See id.  During this time period, 
the government took action to stop some mergers on antitrust bases and thus 
forced breweries to focus improvement efforts on creating efficiencies in the 
production process.  Id. 
 32.  Id. at 94. Economies of scale refers to the reduction in production 
costs per beer that large breweries realize as a result of large-scale 
production, which generates efficiencies, such as a closer-to-capacity 
operation of bottling lines and various automation savings. Elzinga, supra 
note 3, at 97. 
 33.  MITTELMAN, supra note 3, at 186 (“Most industry observers consider 
New Albion to be the country’s first micro-brewer.”). 
 34.  Devin Leonard, Jack McAuliffe, Father of American Craft Brew, 
Brings Back New Albion Ale, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Mar. 29, 2013), 
http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-03-29/jack-mcauliffe-father-of-
american-craft-brew-brings-back-new-albion-ale.  
 35.  Id. at 291 (quoting MAUREEN OGLE, AMBITIOUS BREW: THE STORY OF 
AMERICAN BEER (2007)).  In 2013, the Boston Beer Company helped to revive 
New Albion Ale, and Jack McAuliffe’s daughter is working to continue 
production independently as New Albion Brewing Company.  About Us, NEW 
ALBION BREWING CO., http://www.newalbionbrewing.com/about-us (last 
visited Nov. 16, 2015).   
 36.  Number of Breweries, supra note 25.  
 37.  Brewers Association Announces 2013 Craft Brewer Growth, BREWERS 
ASS’N. https://www.brewersassociation.org/press-releases/brewers-association 
-announces-2013-craft-brewer-growth/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2015).  The rise 
in popularity of craft beer has led to large breweries developing what the 
Brewers Association has termed “crafty” beer.  Craft vs. Crafty: A Statement 
from the Brewers Association, BREWERS ASS’N, (Dec. 13, 2012), 
https://www.brewersassociation.org/press-releases/craft-vs-crafty-a-statement 
-from-the-brewers-association.  Many large breweries have attempted to 
imitate the beer of actual craft breweries.  Id.  For instance, MillerCoors, a—
for now—joint venture between brewing behemoths SABMiller and Molson 
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breweries had rapidly grown to over 4,000.38 
The modern brewing industry contains both macrobreweries 
and craft breweries.39  The largest breweries are the 
macrobreweries, which each produced an average of seventy-nine 
million barrels of beer in 2012.40  In 2013, there were fewer than 
thirty macrobrewery entities, with Anheuser-Busch InBev and 
MillerCoors Brewing Company as perhaps the most prominent 
examples.41  In contrast, the Brewer’s Association42 defines a craft 
brewery as a brewery that: (1) produces six million barrels of beer 
or less annually; (2) is mostly independently owned; and (3) uses 
mostly “traditional or innovative” ingredients in its beers.43  Craft 
breweries can be further defined44 as microbreweries,45 
 
Coors, produces Blue Moon Belgian Wheat Beer, and Anheuser-Busch InBev 
produces Shock Top.  Id.; Great Beers, MILLERCOORS, http://www.miller 
coors.com/Our-Beers/Great-Beers.aspx (last visited Nov. 17, 2015). 
 38.  Bart Watson, U.S. Passes 4,000 Breweries, BREWERS ASS’N (Sept. 28, 
2015), https://www.brewersassociation.org/insights/4000-breweries/. 
 39.  Craft Brewer Defined, supra note 25.  
 40.  Id. (defining large domestic producers as those shipping 10 million 
barrels or more). 
 41.  Number of Breweries, supra note 25; Brewers Association Lists Top 
50 Breweries of 2014, BREWERS ASS’N (Mar. 31, 2015), https://www.brewers 
association.org/press-releases/brewers-association-lists-top-50-breweries-of-
2014/.  
 42.  The Brewers Association is a trade group that promotes craft beer 
and homebrewing.  Purpose, BREWERS ASS’N, http://www.brewersassociation. 
org/brewers-association/purpose (last visited Nov. 20, 2015).  
 43.  Craft Brewer Defined, supra note 25.  To be “independently owned,” 
less than 25% “of the craft brewery [may be] owned or controlled (or 
equivalent economic interest) by an alcoholic beverage industry member that 
is not itself a craft brewer.”  Id.  A “traditional” brewery is one “that has a 
majority of its total beverage alcohol volume in beers whose flavor derives 
from traditional or innovative brewing ingredients and their fermentation.”  
Id.  
 44.  See Craft Beer Industry Market Segments, BREWERS ASS’N, 
http://www.brewersassociation.org/statistics/market-segments (last visited 
Nov. 20, 2015). 
 45.  Microbreweries sell at least 75% of their beer off-site from the 
brewery and produce less than 15,000 barrels of beer each year.  Id.  In 2014, 
there were 1,871 microbreweries—a 28% increase from 2013.  See Number of 
Breweries, supra note 25.  Wisconsin’s Central Water Brewery is—for now—
an example of a microbrewery, which went from producing 750 barrels in its 
first year to being on pace to produce 14,000 barrels in 2014.  Chelsey Lewis, 
Central Waters Serves Up Tasty, Eco-conscious Beer, WIS. TRAILS, 
http://www.wisconsintrails.com/travel/central-waters-serves-up-tasty-eco-
conscious-beer-b99228417z1-251506411.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2015).  
Smaller microbreweries that sell less than thirty barrels a year are 
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brewpubs,46 contract brewing companies,47 and regional craft 
breweries.48 
Breweries franchise with distributors (also known as 
wholesalers), who are responsible for the transportation of beer 
from the brewery to the retailer.49  Since the 1970s, distributors 
have consolidated, which can, in part, be attributed to the 
distributor response to large breweries’ consolidations.50  In 1970, 
there were approximately 6,000 distributors, shipping an average 
of 20,000 barrels each year, but this average has now increased to 
150,000 barrels.51  The largest distributors ship around 10 million 
 
sometimes referred to as nanobreweries.  Jack Kleban & Ingeborg Nickerson, 
The U.S. Craft Brew Industry, in 18 PROC. INT’L ACAD. FOR CASE STUD. no. 1, 
33, 35 (2011), http://www.alliedacademies.biz/Public/Proceedings/Proceedings 
28/IACS%20Proceedings%20Spring%202011.pdf; Cf. Mark Garrison, Pint 
Sized, SLATE (Dec. 12, 2012, 5:19 PM), www.slate.com/articles/business/ 
drink/2012/12/nanobrewing_how_tiny_beer_making_operations_are_changin
g_the_industry.html (noting that the Brewers Association has not provided 
an official definition of a nanobrewery).   
 46.  Brewpubs are establishments that encompass both a restaurant and 
a brewery, and sell 25% or more of its beer at their facility.  Craft Beer 
Industry Market Segments, supra note 44.  In 2014, there were 1,412 
brewpubs—up 10.3% from 2013.  Number of Breweries, supra note 25.   
 47.  Contract brewing companies hire another brewery to produce all or 
some of their beer.  Craft Beer Industry Market Segments, supra note 44.  For 
instance, CB Craft Brewers contracts with breweries, such as Three Heads 
Brewing and Keuka Brewing Company, that are unable to produce on a large 
enough scale.  Contract Beers, CB CRAFT BREWERS, http://www.cbcraftbrewers 
.com/our-beers/contract-beers (last visited Nov. 20, 2015).   
 48.  Regional craft breweries, which make up the majority of the craft-
brewing industry, each produce between 15,000 barrels and 6,000,000 barrels 
of beer annually.  Craft Beer Industry Market Segments, supra note 44.  In 
2014, there were 135 regional craft brewers.  Number of Breweries, supra 
note 25.  This number is 13.4% higher than that in 2013.  Id.  A well-known 
regional craft brewery is the Delaware-based Dogfish Head, which produced 
around 200,000 barrels in 2013.  Chris Furnari, Dogfish Head up 17 Percent 
in 2013, BREWBOUND (Jan. 17, 2014, 4:37 PM), http://www.brewbound.com/ 
news/dogfish-head-up-17-percent-in-2013. 
 49.  See DOUGLAS GLEN WHITMAN, STRANGE BREW: ALCOHOL AND 
GOVERNMENT MONOPOLY 41 n.1 (2003) (describing the franchise relationship); 
What Is a Beer Distributor?, NAT’L BEER WHOLESALERS ASS’N, http://www.nb 
wa.org/about/what-is-a-beer-distributor (last visited Nov. 20, 2015). 
 50.  Tamayo, supra note 8, at 2218 (describing distributors as moving 
from “small family-owned operations to much larger corporations”); see 
WHITMAN, supra note 49, at 2025. 
 51.  Bart Watson, Franchise Laws: Leveling the Playing Field, BREWERS 
ASS’N (Dec. 17, 2014), http://www.brewersassociation.org/insights/franchise-
laws.   
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barrels per year—more than any brewery produces, except for the 
three largest macrobreweries.52  Between 2000 and 2010, the five 
largest distributors increased their market share from one-third to 
one-half.53  These data indicate a trend of distributors shifting 
from small businesses to larger corporations.54 
Meanwhile, the craft brewery market is composed of several 
growing segments.55  This trend of growth is a reverse of the 
decline in number that breweries generally experienced between 
the early 1940s and the late 1970s.56  But while this decline in 
total number of breweries has reversed since the 1970s, an 
opposite trend seems to have affected the beer distributor market, 
with distributors’ average shipping amount greatly increasing as 
the total number of distributors has declined.57  Lawmakers have 
considered the contractual relationship between breweries and 
distributors in developing beer laws.58 
II.  MODERN REGULATION OF BEER: THE THREE-TIER SYSTEM AND 
BEER FRANCHISE LAWS 
The modern three-tier system that separates breweries, 
distributors, and retailers is influenced, at least in part, by the 
desire of temperance advocates to promote regulations that would 
moderate some of alcohol’s ill-effects on society.59  States 
supplement the three-tier system with beer franchise laws that 
provide contractual protections for distributors, including 
franchise protections related to territory, termination, transfer, 
damages and procedure, and operations.60  By separating 
 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  See ALIA AKKAM & KRISTEN WOLFE BIELER, DECADE IN REVIEW 2000-
2009, at 4 (2010), http://www.bevnetwork.com/pdf/jan10_decade.pdf; see also 
Watson, supra note 51 (“[T]he top two beer wholesalers now control roughly 
10% of the beer market.  This is in stark contrast to the past, when there 
were more beer wholesalers who were, on average, much smaller.”). 
 54.  Tamayo, supra note 8, at 2218. 
 55.  See Number of Breweries, supra note 25.  
 56.  Id. 
 57.  See id. 
 58.  See infra Part II (explaining the development of beer distribution 
regulations in the United States). 
 59.  Tamayo, supra note 8, at 2209–10 (describing John D. Rockefeller’s 
effort to implement regulation after prohibition, including the three-tier 
system). 
 60.  Kurtz & Clements, supra note 6, at 402–08 (explaining the 
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breweries, distributors, and retailers into three tiers, the three-
tier system prevents self-distribution and direct-sale by breweries, 
but some states have created exemptions.61 
A. The Roots of Beer Regulation in the Temperance Movement: 
The Three-Tier System 
The temperance movement of the early twentieth century 
fertilized the roots of modern beer regulation.62  Advocates of the 
temperance movement proposed the development of the three-tier 
system after the prohibition on alcohol was lifted.63  The new 
regulatory system was intended to prevent abuses by breweries.64  
Despite implementers’ good intentions, opponents to this system 
argue that it lamentably increases prices within the alcohol 
market.65 
The temperance movement started as a church-sponsored 
movement, and its advocates fought to control alcohol 
consumption by various means, including regulation.66  Much of 
the public viewed breweries as “mischievously increasing 
consumption, causing the drunkenness and financial ruin of 
citizens.”67  Specifically, the movement sought to discourage direct 
relationships between breweries and retailers—termed “tied 
houses”—where breweries owned the retail establishments 
 
development of the beer franchise laws and that the laws function within the 
context of the three-tier system).  
 61.  Tamayo, supra note 8, at 2231 (categorizing self-distribution as a 
favorable alternative for craft brewers to the three-tier system). 
 62.  See David R. Scott, Comment, Brewing Up a Century of Beer: How 
North Carolina Laws Stifle Competition in the Beer Industry and How They 
Should Be Changed, 3 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 417, 420–21 (2013) 
(detailing a temperance study and its proposal for the accepted three-tier 
system and other rejected proposals); Tamayo, supra note 8, at 2208–09 
(describing the same). 
 63.  See Scott, supra note 62, at 421–22.  
 64.  See id. at 422. 
 65.  See, e.g., WHITMAN, supra note 49, at 9. 
 66.  11 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 622 (15th ed. 2002) (“The 
movement spread rapidly under the influence of the churches.”); see Tamayo, 
supra note 8, at 2207–08 (describing how pre-Prohibition temperance 
advocates sought to “promote temperance [by] raising the price of the licenses 
that were required to legally sell alcohol”). 
 67.  Scott, supra note 62, at 420–21 (explaining that these attitudes 
resulted from breweries owning retailers and providing financial incentives 
to sell more product). 
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directly or where breweries induced retailers to carry the 
breweries’ brands exclusively.68  Tied houses were thought to 
allow breweries to coercively influence retailers in a manner that 
caused public disruption.69  To address these large brewery 
abuses, John D. Rockefeller, Jr., a temperance advocate and son of 
the oil tycoon, commissioned a study devising alcohol regulation 
plans for states to implement.70  The study advocated for a three-
tier system, which was subsequently adopted by almost all 
states.71 
The three-tier system operates by dividing breweries, 
distributors, and retailers into different tiers, and is enforced by 
requiring separate licenses at each level.72  The first tier consists 
of breweries, which produce the beer.73  Breweries are required to 
sell their beer to distributors.74  Distributors comprise the second 
tier, and act as intermediaries between breweries and retailers by 
transporting and refrigerating the beer.75  Retailers compose the 
third tier, selling directly to consumers after purchasing the beer 
from distributors.76  States typically prohibit entities from 
operating at more than one tier.77  Thus, this system generally 
prevents breweries from self-distributing to retailers or selling 
directly to consumers.78  To help enforce this regulatory system, 
many states created alcohol agencies to help with the enforcement 
of the three-tier system.79 
 
 68.  See id. at 419–21. 
 69.  See id. at 421. 
 70.  Id.  For the report itself, see RAYMOND B. FOSDICK & ALBERT L. 
SCOTT, TOWARD LIQUOR CONTROL (1933).  
 71.  Scott, supra note 62, at 418, 422. 
 72.  Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 466 (2005). 
 73.  Kurtz & Clements, supra note 6, at 400. 
 74.  Tamayo, supra note 8, at 2204. 
 75.  Id.; What Is a Beer Distributor?, supra note 49. 
 76.  Tamayo, supra note 8, at 2204. 
 77.  See, e.g., id. (describing North Carolina’s three-tier system).  
 78.  See id. at 2200–01.  Self-distribution refers to breweries bypassing 
the second tier and selling directly to retailers, instead of using distributors.  
See infra Section II.B.2.  On the other hand, direct selling or direct-sale refers 
to breweries selling to consumers, bypassing both the second and third tiers.  
See infra Section II.B.3. 
 79.  See NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., THE ROLE OF ALCOHOLIC 
BEVERAGE CONTROL AGENCIES IN THE ENFORCEMENT AND ADJUDICATION OF 
ALCOHOL LAWS 3 (rev. Jul. 2005), http://docplayer.net/942334-The-role-of-
alcohol-beverage-control-agencies-in-the-enforcement-and-adjudication-of-
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Opponents of the three-tier system argue that its structure 
negatively impacts the alcohol industry.  Specifically, they cite the 
“double markup” effect, where, as beer passes through the tiers, 
distributors and retailers “mark up” the price to create their own 
profit.80  For instance, a brewery might sell a six-pack of beer to a 
distributor for $8.00.  To make a profit, the distributor might sell 
that same-six pack to retailers for $9.00.  The retailers might then 
sell the six-pack to the consumer for $10.00.  The principles of 
supply and demand dictate that as the price increases, the 
quantity demanded decreases.81  For that reason, fewer 
consumers would be willing to buy the six-pack at $10.00 rather 
than at the original $8.00 price.  Therefore, some argue that 
consumers purchase less beer because of the increased price 
associated with the “double markup” effect.82 
Whether the three-tier system is essential to preventing large 
brewery abuses, as advocates argue,83 or unnecessarily increases 
the price of beer while lowering demand, as opponents argue,84 it 
is clear that by adopting the three-tier system, states have greatly 
influenced their beer markets. 
B. Laws Supplementing the Three-Tier System 
Lawmakers have implemented a variety of beer regulations, 
in addition to the three-tier system, that generally favor 
distributors.85  Beer franchise laws supplement the three-tier 
 
alcohol-laws.html. 
 80.  See WHITMAN, supra note 49, at 9 (explaining that the double 
markup problem, a natural product of any non-integrated industry, is made 
even worse by franchise termination laws). 
 81.  Id.  Demand is the amount of beer that consumers are willing to 
purchase at a series of prices during a certain period of time.  See DAVID E. 
O’CONNOR & CHRISTOPHER FAILLE, BASIC ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES: A GUIDE FOR 
STUDENTS 31 (2000).  The law of demand dictates an inverse relationship 
between the quantity demanded of the beer and the price of the beer.  See id.  
As a result, the quantity demanded by consumers at a particular price 
decreases as the price of beer increases.  See id. at 31–32.   
 82.  See, e.g., WHITMAN, supra note 49, at 9 (arguing that due to the 
double markup problem, “consumers are worse off because they pay more for 
the product and buy less”). 
 83.  See Tamayo, supra note 8, at 2210–11. 
 84.  See WHITMAN, supra note 49, at 1.  
 85.  Kurtz & Clements, supra note 6, at 402.  
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system with contractual protections for distributors.86  These 
protections include mandated exclusive territory grants, 
termination protections, transfer protections, damages and 
procedural protections, and operational protections.87  States also 
supplement the three-tier system through laws that limit self-
distribution and direct-sale by breweries.88 
1. Beer Franchise Laws 
Many states supplement the three-tier system with other 
forms of regulation, including beer franchise laws.89  Beer 
franchise laws regulate the franchise relationships between the 
first-tier brewery-franchisors and the second-tier distributor-
franchisees.90  This franchise relationship is defined through 
contractual agreements, which are regulated by franchise statutes 
specific to the beer industry.91 
Most of the beer industry’s franchise laws developed in the 
1970s and reflect the market conditions of that time.92  In the 
1970s, market power was consolidated in a decreasing number of 
breweries, while there remained a growing and considerable 
number of distributors.93  This change provided breweries with a 
bargaining advantage over small, often family-owned, 
 
 86.  See id. at 402–07 (explaining that legislatures enacted protections to 
correct an “inherent imbalance of power” between breweries and 
distributors); see also WHITMAN, supra note 49, at 7–8.  For examples of state 
statutory protections of the brewery-distributor relationships, see Illinois’s 
Beer Industry Fair Dealing Act and Texas’s Beer Industry Fair Dealing Law.  
815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 720/1–10 (2014); TEX. ALCO. BEV. CODE ANN. § 102.71–
102.82 (West 2013). 
 87.  See Kurtz & Clements, supra note 6, at 402. 
 88.  See Tamayo, supra note 8, at 2231–35.  
 89.  See Kurtz & Clements, supra note 6, at 402. 
 90.  See Tamayo, supra note 8, at 2213.  The term “franchise” is used to 
refer to various relationships.  See WHITMAN, supra note 49, at 41 n.1.  The 
narrower use refers to “product-license” and “trade-name” franchise 
relationships.  Id.  However, as used in this Comment, it can also refer to 
when businesses create a contractual relationship for the distribution of 
products.  Id.  
 91.  See Kurtz & Clements, supra note 6, at 397–99.   
 92.  See Tamayo, supra note 8, at 2213 (noting that states enacted the 
beer franchise laws “to protect what were then small, family-owned 
distributors” from large breweries in the 1970s). 
 93.  See Watson, supra note 51.  The number of breweries dropped from 
766 in 1935 to eighty-nine in 1978.  Number of Breweries, supra note 25. 
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distributors.94  Breweries had more economic power and greater 
choice of distributors, allowing them to better influence the 
outcome of the franchise negotiations.95  If a brewery was 
unsatisfied with the terms offered by a distributor, the brewery 
had several other distributors it could bargain with for a better 
agreement. 
Beer franchise laws worked to correct the natural imbalance 
in bargaining power between breweries and distributors by 
creating statutorily mandated protections for distributors.96  
These regulations attempted to prevent breweries from controlling 
the outcome of the franchise negotiations.97  These protections 
generally took five forms.  First, many states enacted territorial 
protections that required breweries to provide distributors with 
exclusive sales territories.98  Second, transfer protections limited 
breweries’ abilities to prevent distributors from transferring 
distribution rights.99  Third, termination protections limited 
breweries’ abilities to prematurely terminate agreements, and also 
limited breweries’ abilities to not renew an agreement.100  Fourth, 
damages and procedural mandates provided protections when a 
brewery terminated, failed to renew, or refused to transfer an 
agreement, with breweries typically forced to pay “reasonable 
compensation” regardless of the circumstances, and additional 
damages when good cause was absent.101  Fifth, many states 
enacted operational protections related to the discontinuance of a 
particular line of beer and to prevent discrimination between 
 
 94.  See Kurtz & Clements, supra note 6, at 402 (stating that many 
legislatures passed laws to correct the imbalance that existed between 
breweries and distributors).  
 95.  See Watson, supra note 51.  Still today, the largest macrobreweries 
wield uneven power in franchise relationships with beer distributors.  See 
Kurtz & Clements, supra note 6, at 399. 
 96.  Cf. Kurtz & Clements, supra note 6, at 402–07 (describing the 
various types of statutory protections states have adopted in order to address 
“an inherent imbalance of power”). 
 97.  Id. at 402.  
 98.  Id. at 402–03; see, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 436.1401(1) (2015). 
 99.  Kurtz & Clements, supra note 6, at 403–04; see, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 
474.045 (2013). 
 100.  Kurtz & Clements, supra note 6, at 404–06; see, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. 
§§ 474.011, 474.015; 4 DEL. ADMIN. CODE § 46 (2013).   
 101.  Kurtz & Clements, supra note 6, at 406–07; see, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 
23-1110 (2015); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 60-8A-9(E) (LexisNexis 2015). 
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franchisees.102  While each state’s laws differ, many 
commonalities can be found between the states’ mandated 
protections for distributors. 
a.  Territorial Protections 
Most states require a brewery to provide an exclusive sales 
territory to a distributor.103  As a result of the exclusive grant, no 
other distributors are allowed to distribute the brewery’s product 
in that geographic area.104  Mandatory exclusive sales territories 
are uncommon in franchise agreements outside of the beer 
context;105 this mandatory nature in the beer industry is a 
reflection of the legal environment in which states enacted these 
laws.106  Due to concerns over anticompetitive effects, courts have 
long held that exclusive sales territories to violate federal 
antitrust laws unless state law mandated the exclusive grant.107  
Faced with this “all-or-nothing choice,” many states opted to 
require exclusive territory grants in the beer industry for various 
reasons.108 
 
 102.  2 W. MICHAEL GARNER,  FRANCHISE AND DISTRIBUTION LAW AND 
PRACTICE § 16:2 (Thomson Reuters/West 2009); see, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 3-
13-5(5) (2012) (“No supplier shall . . . [i]mpose, attempt to impose, or enforce 
against a wholesaler any requirement, standard of performance, or term, 
including the terms of sale of malt beverages sold to the wholesaler, which is 
discriminatory as compared with the requirements, standards, or terms 
imposed by the supplier on other similarly situated wholesalers within this 
state.”). 
 103.  See Kurtz & Clements, supra note 6, at 402; see, e.g., MICH. COMP. 
LAWS § 436.1401(1) (“A [brewery] shall grant to each of its wholesalers an 
exclusive sales territory, as agreed upon between the wholesaler and 
[brewery], within which the wholesaler shall be the exclusive distributor of 
the specified brand or brands of the [brewery].”).  
 104.  See WHITMAN, supra note 49, at 23.  
 105.  See Kurtz & Clements, supra note 6, at 402–03.  Outside of the beer 
context, franchisors are generally allowed to grant exclusive territories to 
their franchisees, but most often such rights are not granted.  Id.  
 106.  See WHITMAN, supra note 49, at 25. 
 107.  See id. (citing United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 
(1967)) (stating that the United States Supreme Court had held exclusive 
territories to be per se illegal unless required by state law).  
 108.  Id. (stating that around half of states’ laws mandating exclusive 
territories were enacted in the “all-or-nothing” legal environment).  Prior to 
1977, courts generally held exclusive sales territories to violate the Sherman 
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012), unless required by state law.  Id.  Thus, state laws 
either required or prohibited exclusive sales territories.  Id.  As a result, beer 
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States enacted territorial protections to provide two benefits 
for distributors.  First, these laws protected distributors from the 
“spillover effects” of their efforts to improve product value.109  
Distributors are often responsible for promoting and advertising a 
brand of beer.110  Economists argue that in non-exclusive 
distribution agreements, distributors’ incentives to improve the 
brand are reduced because some distributors may “free ride” on 
the investments of other distributors.111  This free riding problem 
may dissuade some distributors from making the investments 
necessary to build brand loyalty—an effect known as the “shirking 
problem.”112  For instance, when a distributor promotes a product, 
sales might increase, and those new customers associate their 
purchase with the brand of beer rather than a specific distributor; 
thus, when a distributor promotes in a non-exclusive territory, the 
distributor does not exclusively realize the benefits of its 
investment.113  Some of the sales created by the advertising go to 
other distributors that did not pay for the advertising.114  A law 
mandating an exclusive territory for the distributor may 
reestablish the investment incentive. 
In addition to recreating the incentive to promote, economists 
argue that distributors potentially benefit from the ability to 
charge a higher price when selling beer to retailers, which cannot 
be “undercut” by competing distributors.115  Other economists 
 
franchise laws have generally reflected this mandatory nature.  Id.  For 
example, Alabama requires that “[e]ach supplier of beer . . . grant in writing 
to each of its wholesalers an exclusive sales territory.”  ALA. CODE § 28-9-3 
(2014).  The Supreme Court has since overturned Arnold and held that 
exclusive territorial agreements are not per se illegal, recognizing that 
“[i]nterbrand competition . . . is the primary concern of antitrust law,” rather 
than intrabrand competition.  Cont’l T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 
36, 52 n.19, 57–59 (1977). 
 109.  See WHITMAN, supra note 49, at 23.  
 110.  See id. at 12.  
 111.  Id.  
 112.  Id. 
 113.  See id.  
 114.  See id. (“Other wholesalers can free ride off the work of those 
wholesalers who improve the profitability of a brand name they share.”).  
 115.  Id. at 24 (citing Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme 
Court: An Analysis of the Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and 
Potential Competition Decisions, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 282, 283 (1975)) 
(referencing Posner’s characterization of distributors as “cartels” and 
explaining that exclusive territories reduce exposure to other distributors). 
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argue this is not truly a benefit because raising prices only leads 
consumers to purchase less beer, and thus distributors make less 
money overall if the price is too high.116  Besides affecting sales, 
some breweries also argue these protections provide distributors 
with too much control over brand management, allowing 
distributors to decide which brands to distribute and which 
brands to leave in the warehouses.117  Opponents to these 
mandates make similar criticisms of other protections, including 
transfer protections. 
b. Transfer Protections 
Providing more expansive protections than typically seen in 
other industries, most states have enacted transfer protections to 
limit a brewery’s ability to prevent a distributor from transferring 
its distribution rights to another distributor.118  For example, in 
Rhode Island, “[n]o supplier shall, by the terms of an agreement or 
otherwise, unreasonably withhold or delay approval of any 
assignment, sale, or transfer of the stock of a [distributor].”119  
Though less common, these protections are not unheard of in 
other industries.120  The protections are often viewed with less 
hostility than other protections because the terms of the franchise 
agreement also transfer, and in that sense, business can continue 
as usual.121 
 
 116.  See id. 
 117.  Steve Hindy, Opinion, Free Craft Beer!, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/30/opinion/sunday/free-craft-beer.html 
(opining that state laws allow “distributors to select brands and manage 
them however they want—selling those they choose to sell, while letting 
other brands sit in their warehouses”).  
 118.  See Kurtz & Clements, supra note 6, at 403–04; OR. REV. STAT. § 
474.045 (2013) (“No supplier shall interfere with, prevent or unreasonably 
delay the transfer of the wholesaler’s business or any interest therein if the 
wholesaler has provided . . . written notice . . . and the transferee meets 
reasonable standards and qualifications.”).  
 119.  R.I. GEN. LAWS § 3-13-6 (2012).  
 120.   See Kurtz & Clements, supra note 6, at 404 (stating that transfer 
protections in the beer industry “tend to exceed” transfer protections 
generally found in franchisee laws). 
 121.  Id. (stating that transfer protections are “less contentious” because 
the franchisor still receives royalties and generally only the remaining terms 
are transferred, allowing breweries to evaluate the distributor relationship at 
renewal). 
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c. Termination Protections 
Many states mandate termination protections, which prevent 
breweries from prematurely terminating franchise agreements or 
failing to renew them without good cause.122  Most states 
mandate only a good cause requirement, but some states require 
further protections for distributors.123  For example, Wisconsin 
limits how breweries and distributors may define good cause for 
termination and non-renewal.124  The Wisconsin statute limits 
good cause to when a distributor commits “material fraudulent 
conduct,” makes “substantial misrepresentations,” commits a 
felony, sells the beer outside of the authorized territory, or 
becomes insolvent or institutes bankruptcy proceedings or 
otherwise liquidates the business for the benefit of creditors.125  
This statutory good cause standard is meant to supersede broader 
contractual definitions.126 
Outside of the beer industry, franchise laws rarely mandate a 
superseding, heightened good cause standard.127  Proponents 
argue this protection prevents “opportunism” by breweries.128  
They present a rationale similar to the one underlying territorial 
protections: distributors must invest time and money in a 
brewery’s brands,129 and if a brewery prematurely terminates a 
contract, the distributor does not earn its expected return on its 
initial investment of time, effort, and money because the benefits 
of the investment are realized when the brand is later distributed 
through a different distributor.130  Violations of this protection 
can sometimes lead to litigation in which case distributors benefit 
from another set of protections.131 
 
 122.  Id. 
 123.  See id. at 406. 
 124.  See id. 
 125.  WIS. STAT. § 125.33(10)(4)(c)(1)-(4) (2014).  
 126.  See Kurtz & Clements, supra note 6, at 405.   
 127.  See id. at 406.   
 128.  WHITMAN, supra note 49, at 10.  
 129.  Id.  
 130.  Id. at 10–11 (noting that a brewery might either “appropriate” value 
by terminating a contract and transferring the network established to a 
different distributor that is willing to accept “less-desirable terms,” or 
“strong-arm price concessions” by threatening to find a new distributor). 
 131.  See Kurtz & Clements, supra note 6, at 406–07 (describing dispute 
resolution protections and statutory damages provisions). 
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d. Damages and Procedural Protections 
When there is conflict or litigation, distributors often benefit 
from various statutory damages and procedural protections.132  
Damages protections permit a distributor to recover damages 
when a brewery, without good cause, terminates an agreement, 
does not renew an agreement, or refuses to transfer an 
agreement.133  For example, in Idaho, if the brewery terminates 
without good cause, the distributor receives fair market value of 
the distributor’s expenses related to that brand.134  Even if a 
brewery has “good cause,” Idaho still requires the payment of 
“reasonable compensation” to distributors135—a practice 
uncommon outside of the beer industry.136  These damages 
protections work in conjunction with procedural protections, such 
as venue and choice of law requirements favoring distributions, to 
incentivize compliance with franchise agreements.137 
e. Operational Protections 
States have also enacted operational protections for 
distributors, requiring breweries to comply with stringent 
procedures in their operations.138  Some operational protections 
 
 132.  See id. 
 133.  See id. 
 134.  IDAHO CODE § 23-1110(2) (2015).  
 135.  Id. § 23-1110(1).  The statute requires reasonable compensation for 
“the laid-in cost to the distributor of the inventory of the supplier’s products, 
including any taxes paid on the inventory by the distributor, together with a 
reasonable charge for handling of the products.”  Id.; see also  N.M. STAT. 
ANN. § 60-8A-9(E) (LexisNexis 2015) (providing distributors the right to 
recover treble damages when agreements are terminated in bad faith or not 
for good cause).   
 136.  See Kurtz & Clements, supra note 6, at 406–07. 
 137.  See id. at 406 (describing statutes imposing procedural protections, 
such as venue and choice of law requirements favoring the distributor); see, 
e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25000.6(a) (West Supp. 2015) (“A provision in 
an agreement between a beer manufacturer and a beer wholesaler for the 
sale and distribution of beer in this state, which restricts venue to a forum 
outside this state, is void with respect to any claim arising under or relating 
to the agreement involving a beer wholesaler operating within this state.”). 
 138.  See GARNER, supra note 102, § 16:2; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 3-13-5(5) (2012) 
(“No supplier shall . . . [i]mpose, attempt to impose, or enforce against a 
wholesaler any requirement, standard of performance, or term, including the 
terms of sale of malt beverages sold to the wholesaler, which is 
discriminatory as compared with the requirements, standards, or terms 
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relate to the discontinuance of a particular line of beer and 
termination of a contract.139  In Massachusetts, a brewery must 
provide at least 120 days’ notice before discontinuing the sale of a 
beer to a distributor.140  Likewise, in Illinois, a brewery may not 
terminate unless it has good cause and provides “written 
notice.”141 
While some protections focus directly on the relationship 
between a specific brewery and distributor, other protections, such 
as nondiscrimination statutes, focus more broadly on a brewery’s 
relationship with multiple distributors.142 For instance, in some 
states, breweries are prevented from discriminating between 
distributors.143  In Wyoming, a brewery may not “discriminate, 
either directly or indirectly, in price, programs, or terms of sale 
offered to franchisees” where the discrimination would harm 
competition or give a competitive advantage to a distributor.144  
Equal treatment of franchisees is a basic tenet of franchise law 
and is premised on keeping “Pandora’s box to litigation” closed.145 
Overall, beer franchise laws have provided distributors in the 
beer industry with protections greater than those seen in other 
industries.146  The protections reflect the market conditions when 
states implemented the laws.147  When the laws were 
implemented, distributors were comparatively weak from an 
 
imposed by the supplier on other similarly situated wholesalers within this 
state.”). 
 139.  Id. 
 140.  MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 138, § 25E (2010) (“The notice of discontinuance 
of sale shall be furnished by the manufacturer, importer or wholesaler to the 
wholesaler being discontinued at least one hundred and twenty days before 
the effective date of such discontinuance.”). 
 141.   815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 720/3–4 (2014) (stating that “no brewer or beer 
wholesaler may cancel, fail to renew or otherwise terminate an agreement 
unless the party intending that action has good cause for the cancellation” 
and that notice “shall be in writing”). 
 142.  See GARNER, supra note 102, § 16:2. 
 143.  Id. 
 144.  WYO. STAT. ANN. § 12-9-104(v) (LexisNexis 2015).  
 145.  See COLEMAN R. ROSENFIELD, THE LAW OF FRANCHISING OF THE 
FLORIDA AND UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT BARS § 57, at 68 (1970) (“It is a 
cardinal rule that the franchise contract must be kept inviolate.  In order to 
so maintain the contract, the basic and fundamental rule is to treat each 
franchisee equally.” (footnote omitted)).  
 146.  See Kurtz & Clements, supra note 6, at 405–07. 
 147.  See Tamayo, supra note 8, at 2214. 
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economic standpoint, and these protections strengthened the 
bargaining position of distributors.148  However, the beer 
franchise laws do not stand by themselves in protecting the three-
tier system and distributors.149 
2. Self-Distribution Laws 
Many states limit breweries’ abilities to self-distribute beer to 
protect the validity of the three-tier system.150  Self-distribution 
occurs when a brewery distributes directly to retailers and 
bypasses the second-tier distributors.151  State laws regarding 
self-distribution vary, but can be broadly categorized into the five 
following groups: (1) no breweries may self-distribute;152 (2) small 
craft breweries may self-distribute;153 (3) almost all craft 
breweries may self-distribute;154 (4) all breweries may self-
distribute;155 and (5) breweries may self-distribute through 
retailers in which the brewery has a financial interest.156  As of 
2014, fourteen states, plus D.C., did not allow self-distribution, 
while thirty-six states allowed for self-distribution in some 
form.157 
Alabama, for example, strictly adheres to the three-tier 
system, forbidding all breweries from “sell[ing] any alcoholic 
beverages direct to any retailer.”158  Maine is slightly less 
 
 148.  See Kurtz & Clements, supra note 6, at 407. 
 149.  See infra Section II.B.2. 
 150.  See Tamayo, supra note 8, at 2231–35. 
 151.  See id. at 2231. 
 152.  See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 4, §§ 512B, 512C (West Supp. 2014) 
(allowing brewpubs and microbreweries to sell beer directly to customers on 
their licensed premises, but mandating that distribution off-premises be 
handled by wholesalers). 
 153.  See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4-205.08(D)(4) (2014). 
 154.  See, e.g., 235 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-1(a) (2014) (allowing breweries 
that produce up to 930,000 gallons per year to sell a limited amount directly 
to retailers).  
 155.  See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. §§ 04.11.130(b)(2), 04.11.150 (West 2014) 
(allowing brewers to sell beer to “a person who is licensed under this title,” 
which includes “package store” licensees). 
 156.  See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4-205.08(D)(3), (4)(a). 
 157.  Bart Watson, Dr. Statelaws: Or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and 
Love Self-Distribution, BREWERS ASS’N (Apr. 22, 2014), https://www.brewers 
association.org/insights/dr-statelaws-or-how-i-learned-to-stop-worrying-and-
love-self-distribution [hereinafter Dr. Statelaws]. 
 158.  ALA. CODE §§ 28-3A-6(b), 28-9-1 (2014) (stating the intent of the 
ANHALT FINALEDITWORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/5/2016  1:15 PM 
2016] CRAFTING A BEER LAW 183 
restrictive, allowing craft breweries that produce up to 50,000 
gallons a year to self-distribute.159  Other states allow most craft 
breweries to distribute directly to retailers.160  For example, in 
Illinois, a craft brewery producing less than 930,000 gallons of 
beer each year may apply for an exemption to self-distribute no 
more than 232,500 gallons of its beer.161  California has removed 
the second-tier requirement altogether and allows all breweries to 
sell directly to any person allowed to purchase beer.162 
While many states have focused their exemptions on a 
brewery’s annual production, other states, such as Arizona, have 
changed their rules to no longer prohibit breweries from 
possessing a financial interest in retailers or distributors.163  
Others allow craft breweries to have a financial interest in 
retailers or distributors through which the brewery can 
distribute.164  For instance, in Minnesota, breweries that produce 
up to 20,000 barrels may have a financial interest in a distributor 
that sells only that brewery’s products.165  Similarly, in Arizona, a 
“microbrewery” may distribute beer to retailers that are “under 
common ownership” with the brewery.166 
 
statute is, in part, to “maintain a sound, stable, and viable three-tier system 
of distribution of beer to the public”). 
 159.  ME. STAT. tit. 28-A, § 1355-A(3)(B)(2) (2014).  
 160.  See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 33:1-10 (West 2014) (allowing breweries of 
any size to self-distribute to retailers, provided the brewery holds the correct 
license).  
 161.  235 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-12(18)(A) (2014) (“A class 1 brewer licensee, 
who must also be either a licensed brewer or licensed non-resident dealer and 
annually manufacture less than 930,000 gallons of beer, may make 
application to the State Commission for a self-distribution exemption to allow 
the sale of not more than 232,500 gallons of the exemption holder’s beer to 
retail licensees per year.”). 
 162.  CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 23357(a) (West Supp. 2015) (stating that 
licensed breweries are allowed to sell to any person holding a license to sell 
beer and may offer beer for consumer purchase at the brewery). 
 163.  See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4-205.08(D) (2014) (allowing 
microbreweries up to seven retail licenses to operate off-site retail locations 
within the state). 
 164.  See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 340A.301(9)(g) (2014). 
 165.  Id. 
 166.  ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4-205.08(D)(3), (4) (stating that a 
microbrewery may sell to any retail licensees that are “under common 
ownership . . . in any amount” and to other licensed retailers up to 93,000 
gallons).  The statute defines a microbrewery as a brewery that produces not 
more than 6,200,000 gallons per year.  Id. § 4-205.08(D)(2). 
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The reason many states have enacted a self-distribution 
exemption to the three-tier system is to correct the small brewers’ 
dilemma in which distributors lack much incentive to promote or 
distribute small brands.167  Distributors lack incentive because a 
new craft brewery’s brand often has little initial value.168  These 
craft breweries have not yet established relationships with 
retailers and consumers.169  Supporters of the exemption argue 
that through self-distribution, breweries can create value by self-
promoting their brands, which makes the brands more attractive 
to prospective distributors.170  Data have suggested that states 
with self-distribution have a higher number of craft breweries per 
capita and have higher beer production levels.171  The National 
Beer Wholesalers Association (“NBWA”)172 has lobbied against 
these laws, seeking to limit any exemptions to laws prohibiting 
self-distribution.173  Some state laws reflect a compromise of both 
positions; for example, in Kentucky, while “microbreweries” may 
sell beer on-site for off-site consumption, the microbrewery must 
have an agreement with a distributor if it wants to distribute its 
product to other retail sites.174 
 
 167.  See Tamayo, supra note 8, at 2232–33. 
 168.  Id. at 2233. 
 169.  See id.  
 170.  Id. (citing Abram Goldman-Armstrong, Buy a Truck!: The Self-
Distribution Option, AM. BREWER, Summer 2009, at 6, 6–7). 
 171.  Dr. Statelaws, supra note 157.  There is a statistically significant gap 
in the number of craft breweries per capita in states with self-distribution 
and those without self-distribution.  In 2013, states with self-distribution had 
1.41 craft breweries per 100,000 people over the age of 21, while states 
without had 0.77.  Id.  Along the same lines, production of those breweries is 
higher in states with self-distribution: states with self-distribution had an 
average of 2.51 gallons produced per person over the age of 21 in 2013, while 
states without had an average of 1.05 gallons produced.  Id. 
 172.  The National Beer Wholesalers Association represents around 3,300 
beer distributors.  NAT’L BEER WHOLESALERS ASSOC., 2014-2015 REPORT 1 
(2014), https://www.nbwa.org/sites/default/files/NBWA_2014-2015_Report_1. 
pdf. 
 173.  Michelle Minton, Avoid a Beer Monopoly By Setting the Market Free, 
COMPETITIVE ENTER. INST. (Dec. 11, 2012), http://cei.org/onpoint/avoid-beer-
monopoly-setting-market-free (describing the NBWA as “vehemently opposed 
[to] any relaxation of the mandatory three-tier system,” that lobbied Illinois 
lawmakers to minimize a self-distribution exemption to breweries producing 
less than 15,000 barrels each year and distributing 7,500 barrels or less 
independently each year).  
 174.  KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 243.157 (West 2014).  The statute defines 
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Exemptions to the distribution laws take many forms.175  
Each exemption allows certain breweries to get around the 
problem of distributors lacking incentive to distribute new 
brands.176  Although distributors are generally opposed to these 
exemptions,177 some states have maintained self-distribution 
exemptions in addition to a similar exemption to the three-tier 
system, which allows for sales made directly to consumers.178 
3. Direct Sale 
In addition to limiting self-distribution, most states limit the 
ability of breweries to sell beer directly to consumers.179  Direct 
selling differs from self-distribution because self-distribution 
allows a brewery to distribute directly to retailers, while direct 
selling allows a brewery to sell directly to consumers.180  
Generally, there are six categories that states fall into with 
respect to laws governing the direct sale between breweries and 
customers: (1) breweries may not directly sell to consumers;181 (2) 
breweries may provide consumers limited “samples,” with or 
without charge, to be consumed on-site;182 (3) breweries may sell 
to consumers on-site to be consumed off-site;183 (4) breweries may 
operate brewpubs;184 (5) only “small” craft breweries may directly 
sell to consumers;185 and (6) all breweries may directly sell to 
consumers.186  Some states have adopted more than one of these 
 
“microbreweries” as a brewery that produces less than 25,000 barrels a year.  
Id. § 243.157(1)(a). 
 175.  Compare ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4-205.08(D)(4)(b) (2014) (allowing 
only small breweries to self-distribute to retailers), with ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 
04.11.130(b)(2) (West 2014) (allowing all breweries to self-distribute to 
retailers). 
 176.  See Tamayo, supra note 8, at 2232–33. 
 177.  See Minton, supra note 169.  
 178.  See infra Section II.B.3.  
 179.  See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-213 to -214 (2015) (allowing 
breweries to provide only “samples,” with or without charge, on the premises 
where it is produced).  
 180.  See Tamayo, supra note 8, at 2232–33 (discussing self-distribution). 
 181.  See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 67-3-46(2) (2014). 
 182.  See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 28-3A-6(h) (2014); MONT. CODE ANN. § 16-3-
213(2). 
 183.  See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 41-308b(a)(3) (West 2014).  
 184.  See, e.g., id. § 41-308b(a)(5). 
 185.  See, e.g., ME. STAT. tit. 28-A, § 1355-A(2)(D) (2014). 
 186.  See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 23357(a) (West Supp. 2015). 
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approaches.187  For example, Kansas allows for brewpubs while 
also permitting small breweries to sell beer to consumers for off-
site consumption.188 
In regulating distribution and sale, states must still remain 
cognizant of constitutional protections in drafting the exemptions.  
In Granholm v. Heald, the United States Supreme Court 
addressed a direct-selling regulation in the wine industry, holding 
that state laws violate the Dormant Commerce Clause when they 
allow direct sale by in-state wineries, but not by out-of-state 
wineries.189  The Court reasoned that state laws run afoul of the 
Dormant Commerce Clause if they “mandate ‘differential 
treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests that 
benefits the former and burdens the latter.’”190  The decision 
prevented reciprocal agreements where in-state manufacturers 
could directly sell to consumers, but out-of-state manufacturers 
could directly sell only if their home state reciprocally allowed 
those in-state manufacturers to directly sell.191  Some attorneys 
have argued that Granholm applies to the beer context and that 
some existing state beer laws violate this ruling.192  For example, 
one commentator has argued that a Pennsylvania provision 
violates this rule by allowing in-state breweries to directly sell, 
but not allowing out-of-state breweries to do the same.193 
Similar to self-distribution, direct-sale exemptions take many 
different forms.194  In attempting to regulate breweries’ direct 
sales to consumers, some states might create Dormant Commerce 
Clause problems, such as those seen in the wine industry.195  The 
relevancy of the direct-sale issue has increased as technology has 
 
 187.  See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 41-308b (providing for brewpubs as well 
as direct sale of beer to be consumed off-site). 
 188.  Id. 
 189.  544 U.S. 460, 466 (2005).  
 190.  Id. at 472 (quoting Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 
511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994)).  
 191.  See id. at 472–76.  
 192.  See, e.g., David Scott, Don’t Forget the Beer, [May 28, 2013] 
COMPETITIVE ENTER. INST.: ONPOINT  182, at 1, available at http://heartland. 
org/sites/default/files/david_scott-_dont_forget_the_beer.pdf.   
 193.  See id. (citing 47 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4-431 (2012)). 
 194.  Compare ALA. CODE § 28-3A-6(h) (2014) (allowing breweries to 
provide on-site samplings and tastings), with IOWA CODE ANN. § 123.124 
(West 2014) (allowing small breweries to directly sell to consumers). 
 195.  See Scott, supra note 192. 
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developed.196 
C. The Influence of the Internet 
With the growth of e-commerce, a craft beer black market has 
developed.197  If a state does not allow breweries to sell directly to 
consumers or self-distribute to retailers, and if no distributor will 
distribute a brewery’s beer, then consumers are severely limited 
in their ability to purchase the product.198  Some consumers have 
turned to illegally selling and purchasing beer on the Internet.199  
In 2013, an individual was charged after selling five cases of 
Heady Topper brand beer for $825 on Craigslist—a beer that 
normally is sold for $72 a case.200  Similarly, eBay auctioneers 
attempted to sell Russian River Brewing’s Pliny the Elder beer—
normally selling for $5 a bottle—for between $15 and $50 a 
bottle.201  The “Alcohol Policy” of eBay states that it does not 
generally permit alcoholic beverages to be sold, but eBay may, at 
its own discretion, allow sales by pre-approved sellers.202  This 
policy parallels state laws that prohibit the resale of beer by 
unlicensed sellers.203  Thus, most online beer companies ship only 
to a limited number of states through private shipping 
companies.204  Because consumers’ options are limited, they often 
 
 196.  See infra Section II.C. 
 197.  Lisa Rathke, Craze for Coveted Craft Brews Creates Black Market, 
ASSOC. PRESS (Dec. 6, 2013, 10:54 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/craze-
coveted-craft-brews-creates-black-market. 
 198.  See Chen, supra note 10, at 541–42.  
 199.  Id. at 542; Rathke, supra note 197. 
 200.  Rathke, supra note 197.  Heady Topper, produced by The Alchemist 
brewery, is rated one of the top beers in the world by Beer Advocate.  Id.  It is 
sold only in select bars and package stores in Vermont.  Kristi Palma, How to 
Get Your Hands on Heady Topper Beer, BOSTON (Sept. 16, 2014, 4:57 PM), 
http://www.boston.com/travel/new-england/road-trip-where-find-the-wildly-
popular-heady-topper-beer/KbDEBQe020VHFOa0NxkrZI/gallery.html. 
 201.  Rathke, supra note 197. 
 202.  Alcohol Policy, EBAY, http://pages.ebay.com/help/policies/alcohol.html 
(last visited Dec 13, 2015).  Slightly more restrictive, Craigslist prohibits the 
sale of alcohol on its website without exemption. Prohibited, CRAIGSLIST, 
http://www.craigslist.org/about/prohibited (last visited Dec. 13, 2015).  
Additionally, the United States Postal Service does not allow shipment of 
alcohol in the mail.  Shipping Restrictions, USPS, https://www.usps.com/ship/ 
can-you-ship-it.htm (last visited Dec. 13, 2015).  
 203.  See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 28-3A-3(a)(6) (2014). 
 204.  See Beer of the Month Clubs, HALF TIME BEVERAGE, http://www.half 
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struggle to legally purchase certain brands of beer.205 
The inability to purchase certain types of beer is problematic 
because consumers are demanding increased variety in beer.206  A 
2012 study reported that 71% of beer drinkers responded that 
they enjoy having variety in the style of craft beer they drink.207  
In response to this demand, the number of new beer releases 
increased by 113% between 2012 and 2013.208  Further, in the 
first eight months of 2014, variety pack sales of beer increased by 
21%.209  Current laws are preventing consumers from better 
enjoying their desired variety.210 
In its general form, the three-tier system separates breweries, 
distributors, and retailers onto three separate tiers.211  Beer 
franchise laws supplement the three-tier system by providing 
contractual protections for distributors, including those related to 
territories, termination, transfer, damages and procedure, and 
operations.212  The three-tier system, when strictly applied, 
prevents self-distribution and direct-sale by breweries.213  
However, some states have created a range of exemptions.214  The 
growth of e-commerce compounded by distribution difficulties for 
craft breweries has led to the development of an online black 
market for craft beer.215  This Comment proposes a model state 
 
timebeverage.com/beer-club.html (last visited Dec. 13, 2015).  Half Time 
Beverage ships to twenty-one states as well as D.C.  See id.  Courts have 
reasoned that state laws can apply to out-of-state companies selling beer 
online to consumers in that state.  See, e.g., State v. Beer Nuts, Ltd., 29 
S.W.3d 828, 838 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000).  
 205.  See Chen, supra note 10, at 541–42.  
 206.  See David Eisenberg, Mintel: Millennials Demand More Variety, 
BREWBOUND (Jan. 30, 2014, 2:24 PM), http://www.brewbound.com/news/ 
mintel-millennials-demand-more-variety (describing a study revealing 
shifting tastes in alcoholic beverages, with a focus on Millennials). 
 207.  Bart Watson, A Cheers to Craft Beer Choices, BREWERS ASS’N (Aug. 
19, 2014), https://www.brewersassociation.org/insights/craft_beer_choices/. 
 208.  Eisenberg, supra note 206. 
 209.  Eric Gorski, Blog, Variety Pack Sales Jump as Beer Drinkers Seek 
Choices, DENVER POST: FIRST DRAFTS (Sep. 14, 2014, 12:00 PM), http://blogs. 
denverpost.com/beer/2014/09/14/craft-beer-variety-packs/13879/. 
 210.  See Chen, supra note 10, at 541–42.  
 211.  Tamayo, supra note 8, at 2200–01. 
 212.  See Kurtz & Clements, supra note 6, at 402–07. 
 213.  See Tamayo, supra note 8, at 2200–01. 
 214.  See id. at 2231–35. 
 215.  See Rathke, supra note 197. 
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law to remedy these problems.216 
 
III. THE MODEL LAW: CORRECTING REGULATIONS TO PROMOTE VARIETY 
AND COMPETITION 
Many states’ current beer regulations fail in two respects.  
First, states’ regulations do not promote the variety in beer 
selection that consumers are demanding.217  At the same time, 
many state laws do not promote competition—a basic tenet of the 
American economic system.218  To correct these problems, four 
considerations need to guide states’ modifications.  First, 
regulations must correct distributors’ bargaining advantages over 
craft breweries that result from the mandated protections.219  
Second, state legislators must be cognizant of a remaining 
rationale behind certain protections: distributors make 
investments in brands with the expectation of a return on 
investment.220  Third, beer regulations must also consider that 
most macrobreweries still retain a natural bargaining advantage 
over distributors.221  Finally, regulations must provide consumers 
with sufficient access to beer through self-distribution and direct-
sale, while also alleviating breweries’ concerns about choosing 
between pursuing growth and maintaining exemption 
qualifications.222  These four considerations will shape regulations 
to reflect the current market and best promote variety and 
competition. 
 
 216.  See infra Appendix.  
 217.  See Bullard, supra note 2.  
 218.  O’CONNOR & FAILLE, supra note 81, at 31–32 (stating that the law of 
demand dictates an inverse relationship between the quantity demanded of a 
product and the price of the product).  Because current regulations increase 
the price of beer, the quantity demanded decreases.  See id. 
 219.  See supra Section II.B.1. 
 220.  See WHITMAN, supra note 49, at 10–13 (stating that distributors’ 
typical investment in beer brands includes providing brand promotion and 
advertising to retailers, supplying “useful information” about the beer, 
“assuring reliable and frequent deliveries,” and utilizing correct storage and 
refrigeration procedures). 
 221.  See Kurtz & Clements, supra note 6, at 399 (stating that power in 
franchise relationships most often tips in favor of large breweries like 
Anheuser-Busch InBev and MillersCoors, who “dominate” the beer market 
with 80% control over United States sales). 
 222.  See supra Sections II.B.1 & II.B.2. 
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These proposed changes are discussed in more depth below, as 
they are molded in this Comment’s proposed model law.223  This 
model retains the three-tier system to prevent large-brewery 
abuses.224  The proposal, however, exempts small breweries, 
allowing them to self-distribute to retailers and directly sell to 
consumers.225  The Model Law also exempts small breweries from 
the beer franchise mandates that require exclusive grants of 
territories and termination protections.226  State agencies would 
set the specific exemption limits.227  By making these changes, 
states would promote both the variety and competition necessary 
to foster a healthy beer market. 
A. Retention of the Three-Tier System 
Lawmakers enacted the three-tier system to prevent abuses 
by large breweries, including breweries’ coercive influence on 
retailers.228  Due to the consolidation of power amongst the 
largest macrobreweries,229 this potential for abuse still exists 
today.  As a result, the Model Law maintains the three-tier system 
and supplements it with additional anti-coercion provisions and 
prohibitions on financial interests between tiers.230  The division 
of entities into separate tiers diminishes the opportunity for large 
breweries to inappropriately influence both distributors and 
 
 223.  The Model Law is not intended to be an overview of an entire alcohol 
regulation but rather is meant to illustrate remedies to the problems 
harming competition and reducing variety in the beer industry.  In order to 
draw a model law, the following examples use “plain English terms,” which 
might result in an oversimplification of certain sections.  Additionally, state 
regulation often depends on the market of the individual state, and this 
individualized-approach requirement might also result in oversimplification 
for certain sections. 
 224.  See infra Section III.A. 
 225.  See infra Section III.C. 
 226.  See infra Section III.B. 
 227.  See infra Section III.B.2. 
 228.  See WHITMAN, supra note 49, at 3–6 (noting that the three-tier 
system was intended to prevent direct relationships between breweries and 
retailers, which were thought to encourage excessive alcohol consumption). 
 229.  See Kurtz & Clements, supra note 6, at 399 (stating that breweries, 
such as Anheuser-Busch InBev and MillerCoors, retain a large amount of 
market power which allows them to “dominate the beer distribution 
relationship”). 
 230.  See infra Section III.A.2 (providing the three-tier system provisions 
of the Model Law).  
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retailers.231 
1. Problems in Eliminating the Three-Tier System 
The three-tier system is still the best way to prevent large 
brewery abuses.  Alternative remedies do not translate well into 
legislation and are not more effective at stopping the abuses.232  
Eliminating the three-tier system would only expand the potential 
for abuses from the brewery–distributor relationship to the 
brewery–retailer context.233  Additionally, such an elimination is 
not politically feasible because of the NBWA’s political 
influence.234 Consequently, the Model Law retains the three-tier 
system and supplements it with other protections. 
The three-tier system was intended to prevent two abuses: (1) 
direct relationships—termed “tied houses”—between breweries 
and retailers;235 and (2) coercion and undue influence on retailers 
outside of the context of financial ownership by breweries.236  
“Tied houses” and undue influence often resulted in retailers 
exclusively carrying one brewery’s brands.237  Opponents of the 
three-tier system argue that these abuses can be better prevented 
by other means,238 but these arguments are without merit. 
 
 231.  See WHITMAN, supra note 49, at 3–6 (describing the function of the 
tiers as preventing breweries from exerting too much influence on the 
market).  
 232.  See Ross Appel, Is a Mandatory Three Tier System Necessary?, 
KOMLOSSY L., P.A. (Jan. 27, 2014), http://komlossylaw.com/threetier.   
 233.  For example, it could lead to large breweries extending to retailers 
their current practice of offering “incentives” for distributors to exclude other 
breweries’ products.  See A-B Expands Wholesaler Plan, Incentives, ST. LOUIS 
BUS. J. (Apr 3, 2008, 5:19 PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/stlouis/stories/ 
2008/03/31/daily73.html?page=all [hereinafter A-B Wholesaler Plan]; Tripp 
Mickle, Craft Brewers Take Issue with AB InBev Distribution Plan, WALL ST. 
J. (Dec. 7, 2015, 2:16 PM), www.wsj.com/articles/craft-brewers-take-issue-
with-ab-inbev-distribution-plan-1449227668. 
 234.  Disbursements, National Beer Wholesalers Association Political 
Action Committee Filing #992573, SUNLIGHT FOUND.: INFLUENCE EXPLORER, 
http://realtime.influenceexplorer.com/filings/992573/SB/ (last updated Jan. 
18, 2016) [hereinafter Disbursements] (providing campaign finance data for 
the National Beer Wholesalers Association for federal and state elections, 
including candidates and organizations that received money).  
 235.  See WHITMAN, supra note 49, at 3–6. 
 236.  See id. 
 237.  Id. at 3–4. 
 238.  See Appel, supra note 232.  
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Opponents argue that states should instead prohibit financial 
ownership of retailers by breweries and regulate coercive behavior 
by prohibiting “slot fees” that ensure complete ownership of a 
store’s shelf space and a bar’s taps.239  While prohibiting 
ownership interests between breweries and retailers can prevent 
tied houses, such changes would fail to protect retailers from 
coercion and undue influence.240  Prohibiting slot fees that ensure 
complete ownership of a store’s shelf space and a bar’s taps would 
not translate well to legislation because this proposal raises 
several problematic questions.  For instance, what would be the 
proper amount of breweries a retailer must then buy from?  How 
should the law be enforced?  Would the law include rural retailers 
that might face increased transaction costs by purchasing from 
more breweries?  What would be the consequences for violations, 
which often would be unintentional in an industry frequently 
affected by mergers and acquisitions?241  The transactional costs 
alone would outweigh any benefits.  Because of associated costs 
and implementation difficulties, prohibiting ownership and slot 
fees is far from the ideal approach.242  Even if the legislature 
could appropriately detail the requirements, effectiveness would 
prove to be troublesome. 
In addition to the likely political problems, these alternatives, 
even if implemented, would fail to adequately impact large 
brewery abuses.  First, in states prohibiting the purchase of taps, 
these changes have failed to prevent the purchase of bar taps.243  
 
 239.  See, e.g., id. (arguing that the three-tier system is no longer needed 
because tied-houses can be prevented through prohibiting financial 
relationships and through legislation such as prohibitions of slot fees). 
 240.  Contra id. (reasoning that the three-tier system is no longer needed, 
but incorrectly characterizing the three-tier system as having only the 
purpose of preventing tied-houses rather than also preventing coercion and 
undue influence). 
 241.  See PHILIP H. HOWARD, TOO BIG TO ALE? GLOBALIZATION AND 
CONSOLIDATION IN THE BEER INDUSTRY 1 (May 2013), http://www.academia. 
edu/3590129/Too_Big_to_Ale_Globalization_and_Consolidation_in_the_Beer_
Industry (noting that four firms account for 70% of the beer revenues, which 
resulted from a trend of consolidation through mergers, acquisitions, and 
joint ventures).  
 242.  But see Appel, supra note 232.  
 243.  See Daniela Galarza, UPDATE: Beer Brewer Exposes Illegal Pay-to-
Play Tap Practice on Twitter, EATER: BEER HERE (Oct. 14, 2014, 2:38 PM), 
http://www.eater.com/2014/10/14/6976865/beer-brewer-expose-illegal-
committed-taps-twitter (describing Pretty Things Beer’s frustration with 
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Many bars allegedly require breweries to make illegal tap 
payments “under the table.”244  Additionally, by removing the 
three-tier system, the alternatives allow large breweries’ coercive 
behaviors to further extend from the distributor tier to the retailer 
tier.245  Anheuser-Busch InBev, a large macrobrewery, uses its 
voluntary program to incentivize distributors to exclusively 
distribute its products.246  Despite the inability to have a financial 
interest in a distributor, Anheuser-Busch InBev still succeeded in 
pressuring 59% of its distributors to exclusively distribute its beer 
in 2008.247  These exclusive-distribution incentives were part of a 
larger program that allows distributors to accumulate cash-
redeemable points for taking certain marketing actions.248  In 
2015, Anheuser-Busch InBev implemented yet another exclusive 
distribution incentive program for its 500 distributors with the 
goal of doubling distributor participation in the next three 
years.249  Large breweries have succeeded with these incentive 
tactics250 despite anti-coercion statutes.251  Laws further 
 
Boston bars allegedly requiring breweries to buy lines, which is prohibited by 
the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau).  
 244.  See id. (noting one bar owner’s characterization of the pay-to-play 
practice as common with some companies). 
 245.  See A-B Wholesaler Plan, supra note 233 (announcing an expansion 
of Anheuser-Busch InBev’s incentive program, which includes voluntary 
distributor “alignment” through exclusive distribution); see also WHITMAN, 
supra note 49, at 3–4 (describing historical tied houses). 
 246.  A-B Wholesaler Plan, supra note 233; see also Mickle, supra note 
233. 
 247.  A-B Wholesaler Plan, supra note 233; see also Mickle, supra note 
233. 
 248.  Leo Jakobson, The 2013 Grand Motivation Master Winner: Anheuser-
Busch, INCENTIVE MAG. (Jan. 21, 2014), http://www.incentivemag.com//News/ 
Industry/The-2013-Grand-Motivation-Master-Winner—Anheuser-Busch. 
 249.  Mickle, supra note 233 (noting the goal of doubling participation 
from the current 38% participation rate). After the program was 
implemented, the president of Deschutes Brewery announced that one of its 
distributors had dropped Deschutes’ brands.  Id.  Fears over Anheuser-Busch 
InBev’s influence continues to grow, where as of early 2016, Anheuser-Busch 
was awaiting a decision by the United States Justice Department as to 
whether it would approve the merger between Anheuser-Busch InBev and 
SABMiller (excluding SABMiller’s share of MillerCoors). Thomas Buckley, 
SABMiller Buoys Case for AB InBev Takeover as Africa Sales Gain, 
BLOOMBERG BUS. (Jan. 21, 2016, 2:07 AM), www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
articles/2016-01-21/sabmiller-beer-shipments-beat-estimates-on-latin-
america-africa. 
 250.  See id. 
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regulating these incentive programs would become highly 
intrusive, as their success would depend on extensive restrictions 
into the corporate affairs of large breweries.  Eliminating the 
three-tier system would only expand the potential for abuses from 
distributors to retailers by allowing direct interactions between 
breweries and retailers.252  These concerns are a reality in states 
that have completely removed the second-tier requirement, such 
as California, where the United States Justice Department, as of 
late 2015, is investigating whether Anheuser Busch InBev’s 
acquisition of two distributors makes it too difficult for craft 
breweries to get their brands on store shelves.253 
In addition to the likely being ineffective, eliminating the 
three-tier system is also not politically feasible.254  The NBWA 
advocates for the continued mandatory separation of the three 
tiers because the system requires the use of distributors, which 
provides business for its constituent companies.255  Since 1989, 
the NBWA has donated over $40 million to political campaigns.256  
A quarter of that money has been contributed at the state 
level257—the level where three-tier systems have been 
 
 251.  See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 436.1403(3) (2015); see also MARC E. 
SORINI, BEER FRANCHISE LAW SUMMARY 2 (2014), https://www.brewers 
association.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Beer-Franchise-Law-Summary. 
pdf. 
 252.  Cf. A-B Wholesaler Plan, supra note 233 (detailing the influence 
Anheuser-Busch InBev has on distributors through direct relationships).  
This influence could expand to retailers if direct relationships are permitted, 
as was the case with tied houses in the past.  WHITMAN, supra note 49, at 3–
4. 
 253.  Tripp Mickle, Anheuser Says Regulators Have Questioned Pending 
Distributor Buyouts, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 12, 2015, 10:09 PM), www.wsj.com/ 
articles/anheuser-says-regulators-have-questioned-pending-distributor-
buyouts-1444702179.  Currently, Anheuser-Busch InBev owns seventeen of 
its 500 distributors.  Id.   
 254.  See Disbursements, supra note 234.  In addition to making campaign 
contributions, the NBWA has spent a significant amount lobbying the federal 
legislative branch since 2012.  Id. 
 255.  See What Is a Beer Distributor?, supra note 49. 
 256.  National Beer Wholesalers Assn, SUNLIGHT FOUND.: INFLUENCE 
EXPLORER, http://staging.influenceexplorer.com/organization/national-beer-
wholesalers-assn/4703da042a7047eba2bdf4850105d6d6?cycle=2010   
[https://web.archive.org/web/20150507132328/http://influenceexplorer.com/or
ganization/national-beer-wholesalers-assn/4703da042a7047eba2bdf4850105d 
6d6].   
 257.  Id. 
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implemented and thus where they could be reformed.  With this 
amount of influence on policy, eliminating the three-tier system 
would be politically difficult. 
The alternative remedies would fail to prevent the large 
brewery abuses that the three-tier system successfully reduces.  
Added to the problem of these alternative remedies’ 
ineffectiveness, the remedies do not translate well into 
legislation258 and are not politically feasible.  The NBWA 
maintains political influence and supports the three-tier 
system.259  Because the three-tier system remains the best way to 
prevent large brewery abuses, and is politically feasible, the Model 
Law retains it but supplements it with other provisions. 
2. The Three-Tier System in the Model Law 
To minimize abuses by large breweries, states should retain 
the three-tier system.260  The Model Law supplements the system 
by prohibiting financial ownership between tiers in order to 
prevent manipulation of the regulatory structure.261  Along these 
lines, the Model Law also includes anti-coercion provisions.262  
Together, these provisions would sufficiently prevent large-
brewery abuses.   
The Model Law begins by establishing the three-tier system: 
A. Three-Tier System: Malt or brewed beverages are 
distributed through a three-tier system.  The tiers are 
enforced through a licensing system:263 
 
 258.  See Appel, supra note 232. 
 259.  See National Beer Wholesalers Assn, supra note 256; What is a Beer 
Distributor?, supra note 49. 
 260.  See supra Section III.A.1 (describing the problems with completely 
removing the three-tier system, including the potential for large brewery 
abuses); see infra Model Law § A.   
 261.  See infra Model Law § B. 
 262.  See infra Model Law § C. 
 263.  Similar language can be found in many enacted statutes.  See, e.g., 
ARK. CODE. ANN. § 3-5-1101(b) (2014) (“Regulation . . . is considered 
necessary . . . [t]o promote and maintain a sound, stable, and viable three-tier 
system of distribution of beer to the public.”); 235 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/6-1.5 
(2014) (“[T]he primary purpose of this Act is to protect the health, safety, and 
welfare of this State through the sound and careful control and regulation of 
the manufacture, distribution, and sale of alcoholic liquor through a 3-tier 
regulatory system.”). 
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(1) A brewery’s license allows for the production and 
manufacture of malt or brewed beverages.  The 
holder of a brewery’s license may only sell to holders 
of a distributor’s license, except as otherwise stated 
in this statute. 
(2) A distributor’s license allows for the sale or 
delivery to retailers of malt and brewed beverages 
that the distributor purchased from holders of a 
brewery’s license. 
(3) A retail license allows for direct sales to 
consumers. 
These provisions establish the three tiers and regulate 
breweries through a licensing system.264  This basic structure 
sufficiently minimizes large brewery abuses because it prevents 
direct relationships between powerful breweries and small 
retailers, and thereby reduces the potential for a brewery to take 
advantage of a retailer.265  For instance, the distinct tiers limit 
Anheuser-Busch InBev’s ability to coerce retailers to exclusively 
sell its products, as the brewery does with many of its 
distributors.266 
In addition to enacting the three-tier system, the Model Law 
also prohibits the following financial interests: 
B. Prohibition of Financial Interest:267 
 
 264.  A full version of a statute based on the Model Law would 
differentiate certain brewery licenses for different types of establishments.  
See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 125.295 (2014) (stating the department should issue 
separate brewing permits to brewpubs, allowing them to manufacture and 
serve the beer on the premises subject to certain restrictions).  For example, 
brewpubs operate with a brewery and restaurant, and thus different 
restrictions are needed for brewpubs than are needed for a traditional 
brewery.  See id. (providing specific requirements for packaging, container 
size, transportation, and off-site sale). 
 265.  See WHITMAN, supra note 49, at 3–4. 
 266.  See A-B Wholesaler Plan, supra note 233. 
 267.  Existing state law with similar provisions can be found in section 
563.022(14)(a)-(b) of Florida’s Statutes (stating that no brewery “may have an 
interest in the license, business, assets, or corporate stock of a licensed 
distributor nor shall such entity sell directly to any vendor in this state”) and 
in chapter 235, act 5, section 6-4.5(b)-(c) of the Illinois Compiled Statutes 
(stating that “no person licensed as a manufacturer of beer . . . shall have any 
prohibited ownership interest, directly or indirectly, in a person licensed as a 
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(1) No brewery may have a direct or indirect financial 
interest in a distributor or a retailer, except as 
otherwise provided in this statute. 
(2) No distributor of brewed or malt beverages may 
have a direct or indirect financial interest in a 
brewery or retailer, except as otherwise provided in 
this statute. 
(3) No retailers of brewed or malt beverages may 
have a direct or indirect financial interest in a 
brewery or retailer, except as otherwise provided in 
this statute. 
These prohibitions prevent ownership interests between the 
tiers, precluding companies from manipulating the tier system 
through self-owned entities in multiple tiers rather than merely 
having direct operations at those tiers.268  Without these 
provisions, financial ownership would act as a proxy for operating 
outside of the three-tier system.269  These provisions expand the 
effectiveness of the three-tier system and minimize large brewery 
abuses by reducing large brewery control over distributors and 
retailers. 
While the three-tier system’s prohibition of ownership 
prevents direct influences by large breweries, anti-coercion 
provisions are needed to reduce the impact of voluntary incentive 
programs that large breweries, such as Anheuser-Busch InBev, 
use to facilitate exclusive distribution from distributors.270  While 
such provisions271 are not sufficient replacements for the tier-
system in preventing abuses by large breweries, they function as 
 
distributor” and that “no person licensed in this State as a distributor . . . 
shall have any prohibited ownership interest, directly or indirectly, in a 
person licensed as a manufacturer of beer”). 
 268.  See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 563.022(14)(a)-(b) (2014) (prohibiting 
manufacturers from having an interest in distributors); see also WHITMAN, 
supra note 49, at 3–4. 
 269.  Instead of distributing to retailers, large breweries could potentially 
buy a distributor and then exclusively distribute through its self-owned 
distributor.  In this sense, the brewery would effectively operate outside of 
the three-tier structure. 
 270.  See A-B Wholesaler Plan, supra note 233. 
 271.  See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 436.1403 (2015) (providing for both the 
three-tier system and other anti-coercion provisions). 
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an important supplement.  The Model Law includes these addition 
anti-coercion provisions.272  Because there is a broad range of 
possible anti-coercion provisions, the following provisions are 
illustrative rather than exhaustive: 
 
C. Prohibition on Undue Influence and Coercion:273  
A brewery is prohibited from the following: 
(1) Coercing, or attempting to coerce, any distributors 
to accept delivery of beer not ordered or that was 
properly cancelled. 
(2) Coercing, or attempting to coerce, any distributor 
to perform an illegal act by threatening to amend, 
cancel, terminate, or refuse to renew a franchise 
agreement. 
(3) Coercing, or attempting to coerce, a distributor to 
limit its right to sell competing brands of beer unless 
sale would materially impair the quality of service. 
These provisions add another layer of protection to the three-
tier system because they target “coercive” behavior by regulating 
the actions of breweries towards distributors.274  These changes 
protect distributors’ investments in breweries’ brands. The three-
tier system’s ownership prohibition between tiers prevents a 
brewery from owning or operating as a distributor, but it, of 
course, does not prevent direct dealings between two tiers.275  
Consequently, coercion provisions prevent breweries from taking 
advantage of these direct relationships.276  For example, a 
provision in the Model Law prohibits a brewery from coercing a 
distributor into accepting the delivery of beer that the distributor 
did not order.277  The three-tier system, by itself, could not 
 
 272.  See infra Model Law § C. 
 273.  Similar existing provisions can be found in subsections (a) and (d) of 
section 436.1403(3) of Michigan’s Compiled Laws (prohibiting breweries from 
forcing distributors to accept delivery of unordered beer and limiting 
distributors’ rights to sell competitive brands).  
 274.  See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 436.1403(3) (using the word “coerce” to 
describe prohibited brewery conduct).  
 275.  See supra Section III.A. 
 276.  See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 436.1403(3)(a)-(c). 
 277.  See infra Model Law § C(1).   
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prevent such abuses.278 
These provisions would adequately prevent problematic large 
brewery abuses by establishing the three-tier system, preventing 
financial ownership between tiers, and prohibiting undue 
influence and coercion.279  The Model Law would prevent tied 
houses by establishing the three-tier system and prohibiting 
financial ownership between tiers.280  Through these provisions, 
breweries would not be able to directly own retailers.281  
Additionally, all three provisions would work to prevent other 
coercive behavior outside of the context of tied houses.282  The 
anti-coercion provisions, for example, would prevent breweries 
from coercing distributors into accepting cancelled orders, 
performing illegal acts, and limiting their right to sell competing 
brands.  The Model Law succeeds where the alternatives fail; the 
three-tier system minimizes the potential for abuse by limiting 
direct relationships between breweries and retailers.283  Large 
breweries, such as Anheuser-Busch InBev, would not have the 
same direct relationship with retailers that they rely on for their 
successful distributor-incentive programs.284  Through these 
provisions, the Model Law would prevent tied houses and would 
reduce other coercive behaviors. 
B. Small Brewery Exemptions to the Beer Franchise Laws 
States should provide small breweries with exemptions to the 
termination and territory protections of beer franchise laws.  
These mandated protections do not reflect the current market 
conditions, as many states have not substantively updated their 
regulations to reflect the craft beer revolution.285  When the beer 
franchise laws were enacted, the economic strength of a small 
number of large breweries overshadowed the very limited 
 
 278.  See supra Section III.A. 
 279.  See infra Model Law §§ A-C. 
 280.  But see Appel, supra note 232 (arguing that the three-tier system is 
unnecessary to prevent tied houses). 
 281.  See infra Model Law § B. 
 282.  See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 436.1403 (2015) (applying to non-tied-
house relationships between breweries and distributors). 
 283.  See infra Model Law § A. 
 284.  See A-B Wholesaler Plan, supra note 233. 
 285.  See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 28-3A-6 (2014). 
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economic power of many small, family-owned distributors.286  
Given the disparity in number and economic strength, breweries 
had more choice over which distributors to contract with and 
greater influence over franchise negotiations.287  The rationales 
for these protections have disappeared since most of them were 
enacted.288  By exempting small breweries from the termination 
and territory protections, the Model Law improves competition 
and returns control to breweries’ hands,289 while still alleviating 
concerns with large brewery opportunism. 
1. The Disappearing Rationale Behind Mandated Protections 
Since states implemented termination and territory 
protections, the market and legal environments have changed.290  
By not updating these laws as the protections’ rationales 
disappeared, states have created an uneven bargaining 
environment.291  This uneven bargaining environment has 
removed brand control from breweries.292  The removal of brand 
control is especially problematic because breweries cannot often 
afford to engage in litigation to remedy conflicts with distributors, 
the result being that competition in the market is reduced.293 
As has been discussed above, today’s market differs greatly 
from that of the 1970s.294  Approximately ninety-eight percent of 
breweries are craft breweries, who, by definition, are small in 
size.295  As the number of breweries has shot up from a low of 
eighty-nine in 1978, the market power of distributors has 
 
 286.  Tamayo, supra note 8, at 2213. 
 287.  See id.  With more economic power and choice over franchisees, large 
breweries are able to present take-it-or-leave-it offers.  See id.  
 288.  Id. at 2217–18. 
 289.  See infra Sections III.B.1 & III.B.2. 
 290.  Tamayo, supra note 8, at 2202. 
 291.  Id. at 2217–18 (explaining that the relationships between breweries 
and distributors have changed and that some “traps for unwary craft 
breweries” exist). 
 292.  See Hindy, supra note 117 (stating that states’ laws allow 
“distributors to select brands and manage them however they want—selling 
those they choose to sell, while letting other brands sit in their warehouses”).  
 293.  See, e.g., id. (recalling when the Brooklyn Brewery was forced to 
settle because it could not afford litigation costs).  
 294.  See supra Section II.B.1. 
 295.  Number of Breweries, supra note 25. 
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consolidated.296  The average shipping amount increased by 
130,000 barrels during this time period.297  As distributors’ 
relative economic strength has grown, the vast majority of 
breweries is now small craft breweries lacking comparable 
economic clout.298  Yet, the statutorily mandated protections for 
these distributors stayed in place, even with the disappearing 
market rationale.299 
In addition to the disappearing market rationale, the legal 
environment influencing states’ enactment of territory protections 
has changed.300  States enacted the territory protections when the 
legality of such grants depended on whether state law mandated 
them.301  Legislators determined that it was better to always have 
the exclusive territory grants rather than never have them.302  
Today, exclusive territory grants can be legal even when not 
mandated by state law.303  Consequently, in addition to the 
disappearing market rationale, another reason for the mandated 
exclusive territory grants—the all-or-nothing legality—no longer 
applies in the current legal environment.304 
With the former rationales disappearing, the mandated 
 
 296.  Id.; see Tamayo, supra note 8, at 2217–18. 
 297.  Watson, supra note 51 (stating that between 1970 and 2014, the 
average annual shipments per distributor has increased from 20,000 barrels 
to 150,000 barrels). 
 298.  See id. (stating that the “average brewer today looks nothing like the 
brewing industry in the 1970s,” that the number of breweries passed 3,000 in 
2013—most of which are “tiny”—and that the average brewing amount is less 
than 1,000 barrels each year). 
 299.  See id. (“[C]urrent industry dynamics and market power 
relationships are markedly different than they were in the past.  This 
matters, since many beer regulations were crafted in an era when brewers 
were big and wholesalers were small.”). 
 300.  See WHITMAN, supra note 49, at 25 (stating that before 1977, 
“[e]xclusive territories were illegal under federal antitrust law unless they 
were mandated by state law”). 
 301.  Id. (stating that the Supreme Court held exclusive territories to be 
per se illegal and that federal antitrust law made such territories illegal 
unless required by state law); see United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 
388 U.S. 365 (1967). 
 302.  See id. 
 303.  Id. (stating that in 1977 the Supreme Court reserved course on on 
the per se rule against exclusive territory agreements it had announced a 
decade earlier); see Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 
(1977). 
 304.  Id. 
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distributor protections cause an uneven bargaining environment 
for small breweries.305  Most modern distributors have a 
bargaining advantage over craft breweries because of distributors’ 
statutorily mandated protections and their comparatively greater 
natural economic strength.306  The statutory protections 
necessitate the inclusion of highly favorable terms for the 
distributors—terms not common in other industries.307  The 
franchise agreement’s deck is accordingly stacked against craft 
breweries.308  By mandating the protections, the terms are not 
part of a larger give-and-take negotiation.  To illustrate: if a 
brewery desires certain favorable terms, it cannot offer one of the 
mandated provisions as a concession because it is already 
automatically included.  As a result, the brewery may have to 
concede some other favorable term.  The uneven bargaining 
environment results in highly favorable franchise agreements for 
distributors.309 
Adding distributors’ economic strength to the bargaining 
equation sets craft breweries back further.310  For whatever terms 
are left over to negotiate, distributors can often bargain for even 
more favorable terms because craft breweries have minimal 
distribution options—especially new, small craft breweries.311  
Small breweries have less influence and distribution options 
because their comparatively small productions are less valuable 
than large breweries’ productions.312  Additionally, small, new 
 
 305.  See Kurtz & Clements, supra note 6, at 402–07; Tamayo, supra note 
8, at 2217–18.  
 306.  See Kurtz & Clements, supra note 6, at 402–07; Tamayo, supra note 
8, at 2217–18.  
 307.  See Kurtz & Clements, supra note 6, at 405. 
 308.  See id. at 402–07; see also Tamayo, supra note 8, at 2217–18.  
Instead of using a blank slate to negotiate, the slate often has permanent 
etches of territorial protections, transfer protections, termination protections, 
damages and procedural protections, and operational protections.  Kurtz & 
Clements, supra note 6, at 402–07.  Even ignoring that many distributors 
come to the table with more economic strength than most craft breweries, 
craft breweries still automatically begin negotiations at a disadvantaged 
point because of the protections.  See id.  
 309.  See id. at 402. 
 310.  See Tamayo, supra note 8, at 2218. 
 311.  See id. at 2233 (arguing that self-distribution allows a small brewery 
to show distributors that the brand will be profitable in the market, resulting 
in a favorable contract with a signing bonus).  
 312.  See Kurtz & Clements, supra note 6, at 408.  However, this 
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craft breweries’ brands lack value because they have not 
developed consumer bases and because distributors risk receiving 
a smaller return on their requisite investment.313  Consequently, 
the bargaining differential creates a number of issues for craft 
breweries. 
The bargaining differential often results in a lopsided 
franchise agreement that removes brand control from 
breweries.314  One brewer recently wrote in a New York Times op-
ed that the termination and exclusive territory protections allow 
distributors to choose which brands are distributed and which 
brands stay in the warehouse.315  Distributors have this control 
because termination protections require breweries to meet a high 
good cause standard to terminate an agreement.316  Even with 
good cause, some states still require a brewery to pay termination 
damages.317  This control problem is further complicated by 
exclusive territory mandates because breweries cannot turn to 
other distributors if their brands are being distributed in an 
undesirable fashion or, as highlighted by the op-ed, not 
distributed at all.318  Small breweries often have difficulty 
addressing this disadvantage.319 
 
disadvantage is not true of the large, macrobreweries, such as Anheuser-
Busch InBev, who influenced 59% of its distributors to exclusively distribute 
its beer in 2008.  See A-B Wholesaler Plan, supra note 233.  Anheuser-Busch 
InBev is able to use its economic strength to exert control over the operations 
of distributors.  See id.  
 313.  See Tamayo, supra note 8, at 2232.  Distributors are partially 
responsible for the promotion of a brand.  See WHITMAN, supra note 49, at 12.  
With new brands that have not developed a consumer base, distributors have 
to make more investments in advertisement.  Id.  This investment is an extra 
cost added to the risk of trying to sell a brand that does not have regular 
customers.  See id. 
 314.  See Hindy, supra note 117. 
 315.  Id.  
 316.  See Kurtz & Clements, supra note 6, at 405 (comparing beer 
franchise laws with franchise laws of other industries to conclude that 
similar good-cause requirements are generally not mandated). 
 317.  See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 23-1110 (2015) (stating that in the event that 
a franchise agreement is terminated or not renewed by a brewery, the 
distributor is entitled to “reasonable compensation for the laid-in cost to the 
distributor of the inventory of the supplier’s products”). 
 318.  See Hindy, supra note 117. 
 319.  See id. (recounting how Brooklyn Brewery had to settle rather than 
continue with a lawsuit challenging the franchise agreements because it did 
not have adequate litigation funds).  
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As a result of craft breweries’ inherently small size, they often 
lack the funds to challenge distributors in lawsuits.320  The 
brewer who penned the above-referenced op-ed also recollects the 
legal difficulty that his brewery faced: when attempting to 
terminate a contract that provided his brewery could leave “with 
or without cause,” his distributor challenged the provision as 
inconsistent with the statutorily mandated protections.321  The 
brewery settled out of concern about further legal costs.322  Even 
though the brewery settled out of court, it was still left with 
$300,000 in legal fees.323  Craft breweries, being economically 
smaller than macrobreweries and most distributors, often cannot 
afford to litigate disputes with distributors.324 
The “double markup” effect inflates this problem, reducing 
small breweries’ competitiveness in the market.325  Both the 
distributor and the retailer “mark up” the price.326  While the 
brewery might charge $8.00 for a six-pack of beer, the consumer 
may end up paying $10.00 for the same pack.  This problem 
impacts small craft breweries more than it does 
macrobreweries.327  Macrobreweries are often able to lower their 
prices because of economies of scale.328  Production benefits are 
associated with large-scale production, which reduces 
 
 320.  Id. (“[M]any small breweries lack even a fraction of the resources 
needed to take on a big distributor in court.”). 
 321.  Id. 
 322.  See id.  
 323.  Id. One brewery even turned to crowdfunding to assist with legal 
costs. Sue TABC: Operation Six Pack to Go!!, INDIEGOGO, 
https://www.indiegogo. com/projects/sue-tabc-operation-six-pack-to-go#/ (last 
visited Jan. 29, 2016) (raising $34,852 to sue the Texas Alcoholic Beverage 
Commission to allow the on-site sale of beer for off-premise consumption, but 
failing to reach its $100,000 goal). 
 324.  By definition, craft breweries produce small amounts of beer.  See 
Craft Brewer Defined, supra note 25.  Being small in size, craft breweries do 
not benefit from an economy of scale reducing their production costs per beer.  
See Elzinga, supra note 3, at 97–98.  Smaller production and comparatively 
high production costs often result in less money being available for litigation.  
See Hindy, supra note 117. 
 325.  See WHITMAN, supra note 49, at 9–10 (identifying the “double 
markup” effect as an impediment to competition within the beer industry).  
 326.  See id. 
 327.  See Elzinga, supra note 3, at 97–98 (describing how large breweries 
are better able to control production costs than are smaller breweries). 
 328.  Id.  
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macrobreweries’ costs per beer.329  The resulting increase in craft 
beer prices makes craft breweries less competitive than they 
might otherwise be.330  The small brewery exemptions in the 
Model Law would restore competition to the market. 
2. Small Brewery Exemptions from Territory and Termination 
Protections 
The Model Law exempts small breweries from the territory 
and termination protections.331  Because the rationales behind 
these protections no longer apply, the Model Law improves 
competition by creating exemptions.  The small-brewery 
exemptions reduce the double markup effect, return some control 
to breweries, and retain protections against macrobrewery 
opportunism. 
Exemptions for small breweries, when correctly done, improve 
competition in the market.332  If exclusive territory grants and 
termination protections are no longer mandated by statute, 
distributors compete to sell a certain brand to retailers in a 
particular region.333  This regional competition minimizes the 
double markup effect: distributors would not have the same 
latitude to increase the price of beer as it passes to the third tier 
because distributors would be competing for sales.334  If the 
distributor increases the price too much, the retailers could buy 
 
 329.  Id. at 95.  
 330.  An opponent might respond that consumers may be willing to pay a 
premium for craft beer.  But with the rise of large breweries’ imitations of 
craft beers, consumers may be confused about which brands are actually craft 
beer.  See Craft vs. Crafty, supra note 37.  This confusion results in 
competition between craft breweries, who are impacted by relatively high 
costs, and large breweries’ imitation craft beer, which is not so impacted.  Id.  
The competition puts craft breweries at a disadvantage.  See WHITMAN, supra 
note 49, at 9.  Additionally, the increased cost may deter new customers who 
are not interested in paying a premium to experiment with a new brand. 
 331.  See infra Model Law §§ D-E. 
 332.  Cf. Scott, supra note 62, at 426–29 (discussing how North Carolina’s 
beer distribution regulations fail to promote competition). 
 333.  See id. (arguing that exclusive territory grants allow for a distributor 
monopoly to develop, effectively eliminating competition at both the brewery–
distributor level and the brewery–retailer level). 
 334.  See id. at 426–27 (reasoning that when products are substitutes, 
there will be competition between distributors). 
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the brand from another distributor.335  Small brewery exemptions 
force distributors to compete with other regional distributors, 
reducing the double markup effect and improving competition.  
With lower overall prices for consumers, this change would 
increase sales and increase distributors’ overall profits as a 
result.336 
Opponents of eliminating mandated protections argue that 
competition between two brands of beer is sufficient competition 
for the market.337  However, when two brands of beer are not 
“substitutes” for each other, the law does not promote the same 
level of competition.338  Two brands are “substitutes” when a 
consumer would easily substitute one for the other.339  Prices 
increase when two distributors are not competing for 
customers.340 
Additionally, the elimination of the mandates alleviates some 
breweries’ concerns that distributors with exclusive territories 
have the power to decide which brands are distributed and which 
brands are not distributed.341  In a non-exclusive distribution 
region, a brewery may turn to a different distributor if one 
distributor inadequately distributes a brand.342  The removal of 
the mandate returns some product control to breweries.343 
Because these exemptions return some control to breweries, 
 
 335.  See also id. at 431 (stating the current mandates and three-tier 
systems have created a lack of evidence that any growth has occurred in 
North Carolina’s brewing industry and have resulted in a price increase of 
18% to 25%). 
 336.  See id. at 431 (discussing how the three-tier system creates 
artificially high prices). 
 337.  See id. (explaining that the current laws cause “artificial price 
increases” that benefit large breweries and harm small craft breweries, 
whose beer is generally already more expensive).  
 338.  See Scott, supra note 62, at 427 (noting that Natty Greene’s beer is 
not a substitute for Miller Lite, which means that their respective 
distributors will not compete with each other for customers). 
 339.  Id. (suggesting that “Miller Lite and Bud Light may be substitute 
products”). 
 340.  Id. at 426–27 (providing an example where one distributor carries 
Bud Light and another carries Miller Lite, which causes them to compete for 
the business of retailers). 
 341.  Cf. Hindy, supra note 117 (reciting the problems faced by Brooklyn 
Brewing when a distributor failed to meet the breweries’ expectations 
because of the lack of brand control for the brewery). 
 342.  Cf. id. 
 343.  Cf. id. 
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opponents express concern about brewery opportunism.344  
However, by creating these exemptions, terms currently mandated 
by law are not necessarily excluded, but become part of a larger 
“give-and-take” negotiation between the brewery and distributor.  
Consequently, distributors concerned about specific brewery 
opportunism can still bargain for the formally mandated 
protections.  If a distributor wants an exclusive territory grant, 
then it may have to agree to an additional term beneficial to the 
brewery.  These exemptions create a more even bargaining 
environment for franchise negotiations and correct the problems 
caused by the mandates, but still allow for distributors to bargain 
for protection against brewery opportunism. The Model Law 
includes the following provisions exempting small breweries: 
D. Termination Mandate:345 
(1) An independently-owned346 brewery that 
produces less than [amount] barrels of beer and 
whose sales constitute [amount] percent or less of the 
distributor’s total annual brand sales may terminate 
or not renew any agreement with a distributor with 
or without having good cause for such termination or 
nonrenewal. In all other circumstances, a brewery 
may terminate only with good cause as contractually 
defined between the parties. 
 
 344.  See WHITMAN, supra note 49, at 10–11 (stating that a brewery might 
“appropriate” value by terminating a contract and transferring—or 
threatening to—the network established to a different distributor that is 
willing to accept “less-desirable terms”). 
 345.  This provision is loosely based on language from New York’s current 
beer statute.  See N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 55-c(4)(c) (McKinney 2014).  A 
somewhat similar provision can be found in Nevada’s statutes.  See NEV. REV. 
STAT. § 597.160(2) (2014) (exempting breweries that produce under 2,500 
barrels per year from its termination protection provision). 
 346.  The definitional section of the statute would define an independent 
brewery similar to how the Brewers Association does: An independent 
brewery is one where three-quarters or more of the brewery is owned or 
controlled by entities that meet the production exemption set by the Alcohol 
Board.  This definition would eliminate a large brewery end-run of the 
exemption’s production limitations through purchasing craft breweries.  
States would also have the option to measure production cumulatively of all 
entities involved in the ownership structure if, depending on the particular 
market involved, there is a likelihood of abuse of the exemption through 
small-brewery conglomeration.  
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(2) Any brewery meeting the good-cause exemption in 
subsection (1) is not subject to liability provided that 
the brewery provides [amount] days’ notice and prior 
to the termination, pays the distributor the fair 
market value of the distribution rights that will be 
lost or diminished by the termination. 
(3) Disputes are subject to arbitration. 
E. Territorial Protection:347  A brewery shall grant 
each of its distributors an exclusive sales territory. This 
subsection does not apply to an independently-owned 
brewery that sells less than [amount] barrels of beer or 
malted beverages annually. 
H. Agency Authority:348 
(1) The Alcohol Board shall formulate the 
qualifications for exemptions from the termination 
and territorial protections as set out in sections D 
and E.   
Under the termination mandate exemption, the Model Law 
exempts breweries that produce less than a certain number of 
barrels of beer and that constitute less than a certain amount of a 
distributor’s sales.  This section also includes a limitation based 
on the amount the brewery constitutes of the distributor’s total 
sales because this amount indicates the brewery’s level of control 
in its relationship with the distributor.  The more a brewery 
represents of the total sales, the more influence the brewery has 
in the distribution relationship because of the distributor’s heavy 
reliance on those sales.  In the event of conflict, the Model Law 
mandates arbitration to prevent expensive litigation.349  The 
 
 347.  Existing state law with somewhat similar provisions can be found in 
section 12-47-406.3(8) of Colorado’s Revised Statutes, which exempts craft 
breweries completely from franchise mandates. 
 348.  Some states have vested rulemaking authority in state alcohol 
agencies.  See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25750 (West Supp. 2015) (“The 
department shall make and prescribe those reasonable rules as may be 
necessary or proper to carry out the purposes and intent of [California’s 
constitutional amendment concerning alcohol beverage control]” and this 
statute). 
 349.  For a real-life example of such expensive litigation, see Hindy, supra 
note 117. 
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territorial protections exemption focuses only on the production 
levels because the exemption works to reduce the double markup 
effect through distributor competition.350  By focusing on 
production levels, the exemption limit is a proxy for the breweries’ 
economic strength and reduces the chance of brewery 
opportunism.351  The Model Law provides state agencies with the 
authority to set the specific parameters of the small brewery 
exemptions.352  Agencies have the expertise necessary to develop 
appropriate limitations and grace periods based on the particular 
needs of their states. An agency will determine this by examining 
what best serves the underlying purposes of the exemptions.353 
Unless there is a specific market issue in a particular state, 
there is no need to exempt small breweries from the transfer 
protections and the operational protections.  The transfer 
protections are viewed with less hostility because the terms of the 
contract remain intact following such a transfer.354  The 
operational protections for non-discrimination provisions should 
remain mandatory, as is typical in franchise law.355  Its rationale 
lies in preventing litigation,356 which still applies in the modern 
beer market.357  As a result, the exemptions should focus on the 
territory and termination protections. 
To account for the changes in the market, small breweries 
should be exempted from the territory and termination 
protections.  This change creates a more level bargaining field by 
returning some control to small breweries.  The changes also 
 
 350.  See WHITMAN, supra note 49, at 9–10. 
 351.  See id. at 10–11. 
 352.  See infra Model Law § H(1).   
 353.  Determining the specific exemption will require agencies to look at 
the bargaining differential between distributors and breweries in that state 
and provide an exemption to the point where breweries’ and distributors’ 
economic power is fairly balanced. 
 354.  See Kurtz & Clements, supra note 6, at 404 (noting that transfer 
protections are “less contentious” because the franchisor still receives 
royalties and generally only the remaining terms are transferred, allowing 
breweries to reevaluate the distributor relationship at renewal). 
 355.  See ROSENFIELD, supra note 145, § 57, at 68. 
 356.  See id. (stating that operational protections against discrimination 
are necessary to keep “Pandora’s box to litigation” closed). 
 357.  See, e.g., Thom Vogelhuber, Dogfish Head v Glunz; No Settlement in 
Sight, GUYS DRINKING BEER (Nov. 19, 2012), http://www.guysdrinking 
beer.com/glunz-v-dogfish-head-no-settlement-in-sight.  
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improve competition and reduce the double markup effect.  These 
exemptions benefit the market, but should be supplemented by 
changes to laws limiting self-distribution and direct-sale changes. 
C. Self-Distribution and Direct-Sale Exemptions 
Self-distribution and direct-sale laws should provide more 
liberal exemptions for craft breweries.  The same changes should 
be made to both types of laws because both present the same 
problem: small breweries frequently cannot find a distributor to 
distribute their beer because their brands initially lack value.358  
Small breweries are unable to self-remedy this problem because 
many states’ laws prohibit or strictly limit direct-sale to 
consumers359 and self-distribution to retailers.360  Exemptions for 
small breweries would allow those breweries to build brand value, 
making their beer more attractive to distributors.  Liberal 
exemptions would benefit consumers, breweries, and distributors 
alike.361 
Consumers’ ability to purchase certain beer brands is 
constrained because of limits on self-distribution and direct-
sale.362  The distributor bears significant investment costs and 
risks not receiving its expected return on investment because new 
breweries lack consumer and retailer bases—a problem 
compounded by the minimal exposure received through 
advertising.363  Consumers cannot purchase a brewery’s beer 
 
 358.  See Tamayo, supra note 8, at 2232–33. 
 359.  See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 16-3-213(2) (2015) (allowing direct sale 
only in the form of samples to be consumed on a brewery’s premises). 
 360.  See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 4, §§ 512B, 512C (West Supp. 2014) 
(allowing brewpubs and microbreweries to sell beer directly to customers on 
their licensed premises, but mandating that distribution off-premises be 
handled by wholesalers). 
 361.  Consumers benefit through better variety and lower prices.  See 
Chen, supra note 10, at 541.  Breweries benefit by building brand value.  See 
Tamayo, supra note 8, at 2235.  Distributors benefit by knowing ahead of 
time which brands are likely to be successful.  See id.  Additionally, when 
breweries negotiate contracts on a balanced field, breweries will still most 
often distribute through a distributor because distributors are often able to 
operate more efficiently than could a brewery by itself.  See WHITMAN, supra 
note 49, at 23. 
 362.  See Tamayo, supra note 8, at 2232 (discussing how “small and 
unknown brewers often find it difficult to access distribution networks”). 
 363.  See id. at 2235. 
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when no distributor will distribute it and when the brewery is 
unable to directly sell to consumers or self-distribute to 
retailers.364  Self-distribution and direct-sale allowances create a 
legal route to market and reduce instances of black-market sales. 
Even amidst lobbying opposition from distributors, some 
states have exempted craft breweries from the limitations on self-
distribution365 and direct sales366—albeit not without 
problems.367  These exemptions allow breweries to develop brand 
value, making brands more attractive to distributors.368  
However, these exemptions present a new problem: when a craft 
brewery no longer qualifies for the exemption,369 the brewery 
must choose between pursuing growth and limiting production to 
continue self-distribution and direct-sale.370  If the brewery 
continues to grow and surpasses the exemption limit, then the 
brewery can no longer self-distribute or directly sell.  If a brewery 
values self-distribution and direct-sale more than it does growth 
or does not have a network developed, then the brewery must halt 
its production and limit its growth.371  This dilemma must be 
carefully considered by state legislatures or agencies determining 
the appropriate cut-off point. 
The Model Law is drafted to mitigate this issue.  A grace 
period remedies the problem a brewery faces when forced to halt 
growth to develop a distribution network.372  Under a statute 
including a grace period, once the brewery crosses the exemption 
limitation, it has a certain amount of time to end its self-
distribution and direct selling, and to establish franchise 
agreements with distributors.  This window is necessary to allow a 
 
 364.  See Chen, supra note 10, at 541–42.  
 365.  See, e.g., 235 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-1(a) (2014). 
 366.  See, e.g., ME. STAT. tit. 28-A, § 1355-A(2)(D) (2014). 
 367.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 4, §§ 512B(a), 512C(a). 
 368.  See Tamayo, supra note 8, at 2232–35.  A brewery is able to build 
brand value by building a customer base.  See id.  
 369.  For example, a brewery reaches the exemption limit once it reaches 
the production point (or whatever measure the state law uses) set by the 
state agency. 
 370.  See Scott, supra note 62, at 428 (discussing the difficulties of small 
breweries slightly over exemption limit). 
 371.  Or, a brewery might be forced to rush franchise negotiations with 
distributors, resulting in unfavorable terms.  
 372.  See infra Model Law § G. 
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brewery time to react to sudden business changes—changes likely 
in a quickly growing and volatile craft beer market.373  A brewery 
may experience rapid growth,374 or it may be faced with 
unexpected closure.375  The amount of time needed to develop a 
distribution network is unpredictable.376  Forcing a brewery to 
invest in developing a distribution network too early could hamper 
its development.377  The grace period alleviates breweries’ 
concerns about rushing distribution network establishment. 
These proposals are supported by empirical data.  States with 
self-distribution exemptions for smaller breweries have 
experienced a statistically significant increase in the number of 
craft breweries per capita and an increase in production.378  These 
changes have improved the market in many states that have 
implemented them.379  Exemptions help to promote variety and 
competition in the market.380 
The Model Law provides the following self-distribution and 
direct-sale exemptions: 
F. Self-Distribution and Direct-Sale Exemptions: 
Any brewery meeting the qualifications specified by the 
 
 373.  See Thierry Godard, The Economics of Craft Beer, SMARTASSET (Aug. 
12, 2015), https://smartasset.com/insights/the-economics-of-craft-beer. 
 374.  See Daniel Fromson, Idea of the Week: Mapping the Rise of Craft 
Beer, NEW YORKER (June 6, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-
desk/idea-of-the-week-mapping-the-rise-of-craft-beer (identifying two 
breweries—Blackstone Brewery and Karbach Brewing—that grew by over 
1,100% between 2011 and 2012). 
 375.  See Bart Watson, Closings Signal Competition, Not Problems, 
BREWERS ASS’N (Sep. 25, 2014), https://www.brewersassociation.org/insights/ 
closings-signal-competition-not-problems.  
 376.  See Godard, supra note 373 (quoting one brewer who warned that 
although distributors are interested in selling craft beer, “there are too many 
craft breweries for the distribution channel to handle effectively,” and that 
breweries are subjected to the “question of whether [distributors] have room 
in their portfolio”). 
 377.  See Candice Moon, Top 10 Legal Mistakes Made by Craft Breweries, 
CRAFT BREWING BUS. (Sep. 9, 2014), http://www.craftbrewingbusiness.com/ 
business-marketing/top-10-legal-mistakes-made-craft-breweries. 
 378.  See generally MISS. BREWERS GUILD PROJECT, LEGISLATION REVIEW, 
BENCHMARKING, AND ECONOMIC IMPACT STUDY (2014); see also Dr. Statelaws, 
supra note 157 (explaining that states with self-distribution have 1.41 craft 
breweries per 100,000 people over the age of 21, while states without have 
.77).  
 379.  See, e.g., id. at 13. 
 380.  See Dr. Statelaws, supra note 157. 
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Alcohol Board may act as a distributor and/or directly sell 
beer of its own production to consumers.381 
G. Grace Period: When a brewery no longer meets the 
qualification, the brewery is entitled to a grace period, to 
either requalify or end its self-distribution and direct-
sale.  The Alcohol Board shall formulate the grace period. 
H. Agency Authority:  
(2) The Alcohol Board shall formulate the 
qualifications for the self-distribution and direct-sale 
exemptions set out in section F.  The Alcohol Board 
shall also formulate the grace period set out in 
section G.382 
These provisions exempt any small brewery that meets the 
qualifications propounded by the state alcohol agency.  Once a 
brewery outgrows these qualifications, it receives a grace period to 
develop a distribution network or slow its production and 
maintain the right to self-distribute and directly sell to 
consumers.  The specific qualifications are determined by the state 
agency focusing on alcohol regulation, as prescribed in the Model 
Law.383 
The qualifications for the exemption should focus on the point 
when breweries are able to build enough brand value where 
distribution presents a normal amount of risk for the 
distributor.384  The qualification could likely be established with 
data collected through an economic survey. The factors might 
include what the market considers an acceptable risk and return, 
coupled with historical data on when craft breweries have 
 
 381.  Similar provisions can be found in section 04.11.130(b)(2) of the 
Alaska Statutes (allowing all breweries to self-distribute) and in chapter 235, 
section 5/5-1(a) of the Illinois Compiled Statutes (allowing breweries 
producing up to 930,000 gallons annually to self-distribute). 
 382.  Similar language in an existing statute used for a different purpose 
can be found in section 25750(a) of the California Business and Professions 
Code.  
 383.  See infra Model Law § H(2).  
 384.  As a result, the exemption qualification for self-distribution, direct-
sale and the beer franchise laws would not necessarily be the same amount.  
There may be a point where a brewery has built enough brand value to 
attract distributors, but has not yet developed enough economic strength to 
effectively bargain with distributors.  
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typically succeeded in forming franchise agreements. The latter 
factor might look at the number of customers and the amount of 
advertising the brand has received.  In addition, determining the 
length of the grace period would likely involve analyzing the 
average time it takes to convert from self-distribution and direct-
sale to establishing a distribution network through independent 
distributors. 
It might be argued that instead of exemptions, craft breweries 
should merely have their own regulatory regime under which they 
apply for a separate license.  However, these exemptions 
constitute a small portion of the overall beer regulations.  An 
entirely new system just for small breweries would be duplicative 
and would lead to interpretative confusion.  Non-lawyer brewers 
are the audience for these statutes—individuals often without the 
resources to hire an attorney.385  A debate over intended and 
unintended differences between the statutes would create 
confusion about the interpretation of the statutes.  Using the 
exemption system reduces duplication of laws and the potential 
for confusion. 
The direct-sale and self-distribution exemptions benefit 
breweries, distributors, and consumers.  Breweries that lack the 
size and value to contract successfully with distributors have an 
alternative method of distribution.  The exemptions also benefit 
distributors because the exemptions allow breweries to build and 
prove their brand’s value, minimizing the risk posed to 
distributors by outlaying resources on fledgling breweries of 
uncertain value. Consumers benefit because they have access to a 
greater variety of beer at lower prices.  The Model Law’s 
exemptions promote variety and competition in the market. 
CONCLUSION 
Current regulations stifle competition and reduce variety in 
the beer market.  The three-tier system should be retained to 
prevent abuses by large breweries.  However, because craft 
breweries’ brands often lack value, state laws should provide self-
distribution and direct-sale exemptions for craft breweries.  At the 
same time, state laws should also provide craft breweries with 
 
 385.  See Moon, supra note 377 (discussing the need for counsel to assist 
breweries navigate their legal environments). 
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exemptions from the statutorily mandated protections to balance 
the bargaining relationship.  There is a growing need for these 
changes to benefit both breweries and distributors, but the 
changes require both sides to come to the table and compromise.  
As the president of the Brewers Association recently remarked, 
“[t]here’s beer at the table.  Why aren’t we both sitting around 
that table?”386 
 
 386.  Charlie Papazian, Beer Franchise Law Reform, BREWERS ASS’N (May 
28, 2014), https://www.brewersassociation.org/news/beer-franchise-law-re 
form. 
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APPENDIX: THE MODEL LAW 
A. Three-Tier System: Malt or brewed beverages are 
distributed through a three-tier system.  The tiers are 
enforced through a licensing system: 
(1) A brewery’s license allows for the production and 
manufacture of malt or brewed beverages. The holder 
of a brewery’s license may only sell to holders of a 
distributor’s license, except as otherwise stated in 
this statute.  
(2) A distributor’s license allows for the sale or 
delivery to retailers of malt and brewed beverages 
that the distributor purchased from holders of a 
brewery’s license.  
(3) A retail license allows for direct sales to 
consumers.  
B. Prohibition of Financial Interest: 
(1) No brewery may have a direct or indirect financial 
interest in a distributor or a retailer, except as 
otherwise provided in this statute.  
(2) No distributor of brewed or malt beverages may 
have a direct or indirect financial interest in a 
brewery or retailer, except as otherwise provided in 
this statute.  
(3) No retailers of brewed or malt beverages may 
have a direct or indirect financial interest in a 
brewery or retailer, except as otherwise provided in 
this statute.  
C. Prohibition on Undue Influence and Coercion: A 
brewery is prohibited from the following: 
(1) Coercing, or attempting to coerce, any distributors 
to accept delivery of beer not ordered or that was 
properly cancelled.  
(2) Coercing, or attempting to coerce, any distributor 
to perform an illegal act by threatening to amend, 
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cancel, terminate, or refuse to renew a franchise 
agreement.  
(3) Coercing, or attempting to coerce, a distributor to 
limit its right to sell competing brands of beer unless 
sale would materially impair the quality of service.  
D. Termination Mandate: 
(1) An independently-owned brewery that produces 
less than [amount] barrels of beer and whose sales 
constitute [amount] percent or less of the 
distributor’s total annual brand sales may terminate 
or not renew any agreement with a distributor with 
or without having good cause for such termination or 
nonrenewal.  In all other circumstances, a brewery 
may terminate only with good cause as contractually 
defined between the parties.  
(2) Any brewery meeting the good-cause exemption in 
subsection (1) is not subject to liability provided that 
the brewery provides [amount] days’ notice and prior 
to the termination, pays the distributor the fair 
market value of the distribution rights that will be 
lost or diminished by the termination.  
(3) Disputes are subject to arbitration.  
E. Territorial Protection: A brewery shall grant each of its 
distributors an exclusive sales territory.  This subsection does 
not apply to an independently-owned brewery that sells less 
than [amount] barrels of beer or malted beverages annually.  
F. Self-Distribution and Direct-Sale Exemptions: Any 
brewery meeting the qualifications specified by the Alcohol 
Board may act as a distributor and/or directly sell beer of its 
own production to consumers. 
G. Grace Period: When a brewery no longer meets the 
qualification, the brewery is entitled to a grace period, to 
either requalify or end its self-distribution and direct-sale. 
The Alcohol Board shall formulate the grace period.  
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H. Agency Authority: 
(1) The Alcohol Board shall formulate the 
qualifications for exemptions from the termination 
and territorial protections as set out in sections D 
and E.  
(2) The Alcohol Board shall formulate the 
qualifications for the self-distribution and direct-sale 
exemptions set out in section F.  The Alcohol Board 
shall also formulate the grace period set out in 
section G. 
 
